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Abstract 
Physicians practicing in capitation-based Family Health Organizations and fee-for-service-
based Family Health Groups receive bonuses for delivering preventive care, including 
cervical cancer screening, while those practicing in the traditional fee-for-service model do 
not. Financial incentives were introduced to increase Ontario’s cervical screening rate to 
85%. To date, the impact of incentives for cervical screening on screening rate and cost-
effectiveness have not been assessed. Patient-level data obtained from the Institute for 
Clinical Evaluative Sciences were used to estimate primary care model screening rates and 
cancer treatment costs. A microsimulation model was developed from published cervical 
cancer natural history models and parameterized using Ontario data. My results show 
significant differences in Pap smear rates across primary care model type, and that financial 
incentives are associated with slightly greater quality-adjusted life years. In conclusion, 
primary care models featuring incentives are associated with higher screening rates and 
appear cost-effective compared to the traditional FFS model. 
 
Keywords 
Primary care, financial incentives, pay-for-performance, remuneration, fee-for-service, 
capitation, cost-effectiveness, cervical cancer screening, Ontario. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Cervical Cancer 
Cervical cancer is a chronic disease caused by persistent infection with human 
papillomavirus (HPV) in the epithelial cells of the cervical transformation zone. The 
cervix connects the vagina to the uterus and has two main parts: the exocervix and the 
endocervix. The transformation zone is where the cervical epithelial cells change from 
glandular cells of the endocervix to squamous cells of the exocervix. 
While infection with HPV is a necessary cause for cervical cancer, infections are 
common and the majority regress spontaneously [1,2]. The outcome of an infection is 
largely dependent on HPV type [3,4]. Although around 40 HPV types are known to infect 
the genital tract, about 15 types are considered to have a high-risk of developing cervical 
cancer [3-5]. The most prevalent types among cervical cancer cases are HPV-16 and 
HPV-18 representing 70% of cases [5]. Low-risk types are usually associated with benign 
changes in the cervical epithelium, but cervical intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN) may be 
associated with a low-risk type [6].  
Infection occurs when the virus binds to and enters the basal epithelial cells of the 
cervical transformation zone [5,7]. Infection may cause increased basal and suprabasal 
cell proliferation, which may eventually lead to lesion formation in the cervix [5]. Most 
infections and lesions are transient and clear on their own [8]. However persistent 
infection may cause the development of neoplastic cells if the viral genome is integrated 
into the host chromosome [7]. There are two main types of cervical cancer: squamous 
cell carcinoma (SCC) accounts for approximately 85% of cases and adenocarcinoma 
(AC) accounts for 15-20% [9,10]. Women with a persistent infection of the squamous 
cells with one or more high-risk type may develop low-grade squamous intraepithelial 
lesions (LSIL). These lesions are indicative of mild to moderate cervical dysplasia and 
are classified as CIN grade 1 or 2. LSIL may regress, experience no change or progress to 
high-grade squamous intraepithelial lesions (HSIL) [7]. HSIL represents severe cervical 
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dysplasia and is classified as CIN grade 3 or carcinoma in situ (CIS). Women with HSIL 
may also clear their infections partially or completely, but their infections are more likely 
to persist and progress to SCC [7]. AC is caused by persistent infection in the glandular 
cells and is preceded by adenocaricnoma in situ (AIS). The natural history of AC is not 
well understood compared to SCC [10].  
HPV is transmitted sexually, so risk of infection and developing cervical cancer are 
related to sexual behaviour. Infection risk is influenced by age of first sexual activity, 
number of lifetime partners, condom use and sexual encounters with high-risk individuals 
[2,7,11,12]. Peak infection rate occurs in women under 25 years, and incident infections 
are mostly transient among women of all ages [8]. Increasing parity, long-term oral 
contraceptive use, smoking and infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) are 
also associated with an elevated risk of cervical cancer [8].  
1.2 Burden of Cervical Cancer 
Cervical cancer accounts for 9% of new cases of cancer in women worldwide, making it 
the third most commonly diagnosed cancer in women [13]. In 2008 there were an 
estimated 529,000 incident cases of cervical cancer and 275,000 related deaths [13]. 
However developing countries are disproportionately affected and account for over 85% 
of cervical cancer cases and deaths [14]. Incidence and mortality rates in developed 
countries are a fraction of those in developing regions, which is predominantly due to a 
lack of screening in low-resource countries [14]. The cumulative risk of developing 
cervical cancer for a woman in the developing world is 1.9% [14], whereas a Canadian 
woman has a 0.7% lifetime risk [15].  
Each year about 91,400 Canadian women are diagnosed with cancer, and cervical cancer 
accounts for 1.6% of all cases [15].  In 2013 there were an estimated 1,450 incident cases 
and 380 deaths from cervical cancer, and each year an estimated 610 women are 
diagnosed with and 150 die from cervical cancer in Ontario [15].  
The five-year relative survival ratio for Canadian women is 72% [15]. Age at diagnosis is 
an important prognostic factor, which may be related to later stage at diagnosis of older 
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women who are less likely to be screened [16]. Peak excess mortality occurs in the first 
year after diagnosis [17]. 
1.3 Cervical Cancer Screening 
Cervical cancer screening is a method of secondary prevention that aims to reduce 
cervical cancer risk by detecting and treating cervical lesions that may become malignant 
[18]. Screening with the Papanicolaou (Pap) smear was first introduced in Canada in 
1949, and widespread uptake of screening began in the 1970s [19]. Although the 
effectiveness of Pap smears for preventing cervical cancer has never been studied in a 
clinical trial, there is substantial epidemiological evidence to support its use for reducing 
cervical cancer incidence and mortality [20-22]. Between 1972 and 2006, Canadian 
incidence and mortality rates decreased by 58% and 71%, respectively [19]. The drastic 
decline in rates is largely attributed to the successes of screening [19]. The slow 
progression from HPV infection to dysplasia to invasive cancer may take years [23]; 
therefore regular screening and follow-up of abnormal results can prevent cancer by 
detecting and treating precancerous lesions [19,21]. Pap smears can also detect 
preclinical cancers at an earlier stage, which require less aggressive treatment and have 
better survival.  
Ontario guidelines recommend women who are or have ever been sexually active be 
screened with a Pap test once every three years beginning at age 21 and ceasing at age 70 
given adequate negative screen history [18,20]. The Ontario Cervical Screening Program 
has sent letters to eligible women to invite them to screening, advise them of Pap test 
results and remind them to return for screening since 2013. A woman’s primary care 
physician usually performs Pap tests.  
Screening participation has increased slightly since 2000, but is well below the provincial 
target of 85%. The estimated three-year screening rates among women aged 20 to 69 in 
2010 and 2011 were between 65% and 72% [24,25]. Some groups of women are less 
likely to be screened than others. Screening participation decreases with age and women 
living in low-income area are less likely to be screened than women from high-income 
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areas [25]. Women with access to a primary care physician are more likely to be screened 
than those without a regular provider [26,27]. 
1.4 Cervical Dysplasia and Cervical Cancer Care 
Abnormal Pap smear results are not uncommon and about 5.5% of women screened in 
2012 had an abnormal result [24]. Women with a test result of atypical squamous cells of 
unknown significance (ASCUS) are recommended to undergo active surveillance with 
repeat Pap testing every six months. Women with LSIL are often recommended active 
surveillance, but some may receive immediate treatment. If a repeat Pap smear is 
abnormal then women are referred to colposcopy for further investigation. After three 
negative smears over a period of a year and a half, women may return to the normal 
screening interval. Referral to colposcopy is also recommended for a primary test result 
of HSIL, atypical squamous cells cannot exclude HSIL (ASC-H), atypical glandular cells 
(AGC), CIS, AIS or other malignant neoplasms. 
Colposcopy is a diagnostic procedure that magnifies the inside of the cervix and vagina 
for inspection. A biopsy is usually taken concomitantly for a definitive diagnosis of CIN 
or cancer. Women with CIN or CIS may be treated with loop electrosurgical excision 
procedure (LEEP), laser excision, cone biopsy, cryosurgery or hysterectomy. If a biopsy 
reveals malignant cells then the cancer is staged and graded before deciding on a 
treatment course. 
Primary treatment of early stage cancers is often surgical. A hysterectomy removes the 
entire uterus and may be accompanied by removal of the pelvic or para-aortic lymph 
nodes. A radical hysterectomy is when the uterus and surrounding parametrium are 
removed and the pelvic lymph nodes are dissected. Younger women wishing to preserve 
their fertility may receive a radical cervicectomy with or without lymph node dissection, 
which removes the cervix while leaving the uterus in tact. Over half of Ontario cases 
receive surgery for their cancer with younger women being most likely to have surgery 
[28]. Older women, those with significant comorbidities, or advanced cases are 
recommended primary treatment with radiation therapy with or without concurrent 
cisplatin [28]. Concurrent radiation and cisplatin is also recommended for high-risk early 
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stage cancers following hysterectomy [29]. Recurrent, metastatic or persistent cancers are 
recommended treatment with cisplatin in combination with topotecan [30]. After 
successful treatment, follow-up is recommended every three to four months in the first 
two disease-free years and every six to 12 months between years three and five [31]. 
Women may return to annual assessment with their family physician after five years of 
remission [31]. 
1.5 Interventions to Increase Cervical Cancer Screening 
Women that are never screened or not screened during the recommended interval have 
increased risks of cervical cancer, later stage at diagnosis and cervical cancer-related 
mortality [32-33]. Despite the risks of non-compliance and widespread availability of 
screening, many women do not participate. Effective interventions to increase screening 
participation are necessary to reduce the risks of cervical cancer and future burden on the 
healthcare system. Patient-directed interventions, such as tailored reminders and 
education programs, have been shown to effectively increase cancer screening rates 
[35,36]. However provider-directed interventions are also needed, as physician 
recommendation to screen is a strong predictor of screening adherence [37]. Provider 
reminders, audit and feedback, and recall systems are recommended to increase cervical, 
breast and colorectal cancer screening rates [35,36,38]. Provider incentives are being 
increasingly advocated to improve quality of health care services, including improved 
cancer screening; however the existing findings are inconclusive and further research is 
needed to assess their effectiveness [35,36,39-41]. 
1.6 Financial Incentives 
Financial incentives are implicit or explicit rewards to encourage a physician to provide 
high quality care and deliver cancer screening manoeuvres. Remuneration schemes are 
implicit incentive contracts that link a principal (e.g. government health plan, private 
insurer) to an agent (e.g. primary care physician) to provide targeted services. The 
traditional funding model is a fee-for-service (FFS) system where a physician is paid for 
each service provided to patients. One alternative to FFS is a capitation payment system, 
in which a physician receives a fixed payment for each patient enrolled and is obliged to 
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provide specific services to these patients. Explicit incentives directly reward physicians 
for quality in specific areas of care. Explicit incentives include one-time bonuses, per-
patient premiums or pay-for-performance (P4P) bonuses with stepped payments.  
The effect of provider remuneration on preventive care delivery has not been widely 
studied and is poorly understood (detailed literature review in the following section). 
Some studies on P4P incentives report modest improvements in cervical cancer 
screening, but the evidence is inconclusive [36,39-41]. Few studies have evaluated 
implicit or explicit incentives in Canada, and it is difficult to draw conclusions from 
evidence from other health care systems within the context of universal healthcare in 
Canada.  
To date there has been no economic analysis of financial incentives for cervical cancer 
screening. As the popularity of alternative funding arrangement and P4P incentives grow 
in Ontario and throughout Canada, it is imperative that the most cost-effective ways of 
delivering care are chosen. 
1.7 Literature Review 
1.7.1 Primary Care 
Primary care is the patient’s first point of contact with the health care system providing a 
point of referral to specialists if needed [42]. A primary care physician may be a family 
physician, general practitioner, general pediatrician or general internist [43]. The primary 
care physician-patient relationship is long lasting and focused on overall patient health, 
whereas the specialist-patient relationship may be shorter and more disease focused 
[42,43]. Primary care physicians provide comprehensive care and their services range 
from preventive to rehabilitative [42,43]. Providers address the majority of their patients’ 
health care needs and are usually the point of referral to specialists [42].  
Strong primary care systems lead to better health outcomes and areas with more primary 
care physicians are consistently associated with lower rates of all-cause and cancer-
related mortality and improved patient satisfaction [43]. Access to a primary care 
physician increases the chances of receiving needed services and earlier diagnoses 
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[44,45] and reduces the likelihood of emergency room visits and hospitalizations [46]. 
Women with regular family physicians are more likely to be screened for cervical (odds 
ratio [OR]: 1.30, 95% confidence interval [CI] 1.17 – 1.46) and breast cancer (OR: 1.38, 
95% CI 1.16 – 1.64) [47]. Similarly, Ontario breast cancer patients living in areas with 
greater supplies of general practitioners were significantly more likely to be diagnosed 
with localized cancer, indicating higher mammography rates in areas with better access to 
primary care [48]. Increased health promotion and screening rates of primary care 
providers may lead to earlier cancer diagnoses and improved survival [49]. Indeed, 
increased supply of family physicians is associated with decreased rates of cervical 
cancer incidence and related mortality [50].  
1.7.2 Primary Care Reform 
The association between strong primary care systems and improved health outcomes 
sparked interest in optimizing the organization, delivery and funding of primary care 
models to deliver high-quality, cost-effective, equitable care [51]. Many developed 
nations strengthened their primary care systems and access to care towards the end of the 
20th century; however Canada, and particularly Ontario, lagged behind [52,53]. A survey 
of primary care physicians from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom 
and the United States reported that Canadian physicians were most concerned about 
health care quality [54]. Canada had the highest proportions of physicians reporting that 
their ability to provide quality care had deteriorated in the past five years (59%) and that 
they were very concerned about increasing wait times (75%) [54]. In 1998 Canada had 
the third lowest ratio of physician to population among eight developed nations [55] and 
was the only country to have a negative growth rate of physicians per population [56].  
Within Canada, Ontario’s primary care systems lagged behind the other provinces. The 
absolute number of primary care physicians remained relatively constant during the 
1990s, but population growth resulted in a decline in the number of physicians per 
population [57,58]. By 2000 Ontario had the second lowest provincial ratio of family 
physicians to population with only 85 physicians per 100,000 persons [57]. Limited 
access to primary care in Ontario was due in part to higher specialist income, 
maldistribution of physicians and preference for graduates to specialize [59,60].  
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Primary care systems are often defined by their organizational structure, delivery 
methods and remuneration model [61]. Historically, the primary care landscape in 
Ontario was made up by privately owned and managed solo or small group practices of 
family physicians and general practitioners [61]. Since the majority of primary care 
providers were physicians, of whom less than 10% worked in multidisciplinary practices, 
delivery of primary care had a strong physician focus [61]. While alternative payment 
schemes existed, the vast majority of Canadian primary care physicians were reimbursed 
on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis. In 1998 89% of Canadian family physicians received 
some income from FFS payments, which accounted for an average 88% of their total 
income [62]. About 20% of family physicians received a salary, which accounted for 
56% of their total income [62]. Only 1.5 of FPs received capitation based payments, 
which derived 72% of their total income [62].  
Innovations to primary care in Canada have been introduced several times during the 
20th century, but thus far failed to achieve true reform [52]. In the late 1970’s Health 
Services Organizations (HSO) and Community Health Centres (CHC) were introduced to 
Ontario as alternatives to conventional practices [61]. These organizations delivered PC 
differently by incorporating nurses, nurse practitioners and other healthcare providers 
[61]. While HSOs remained physician owned, CHCs are governed by a community 
board. They also adopted alternative funding methods with HSOs being capitation based 
and CHCs being salaried. Pilot primary care models, such as Primary Care Networks, 
were launched in the mid-1990s in Ontario in the hopes of identifying innovative ways of 
organizing, delivering and funding primary care [61]. Despite the calls for and attempts 
of innovation and reform to Canadian primary care systems, little change was achieved 
[62,62]. In the early 2000s the federal government established five national reform goals: 
increased access to primary care services, increased emphasis on health promotion, 
preventive health and chronic disease management, increasing all-day access to essential 
services, increasing the number of primary care physicians working in interdisciplinary 
teams, and integrating primary care with other healthcare services [52].  
In response to the new national objectives, Ontario took steps to overhaul its primary care 
system. New organizational and funding models were created to meet the diverse needs 
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of providers and communities, promote inter-professional delivery of care, increase 
patient access and improve efficiency [52]. Common elements of the new models include 
group practices with shared responsibilities, provision of after-hours care, and patient 
enrolment. Participation in the new models is voluntary, so financial incentives were 
embedded in the new contract models. One of the biggest policy changes in the last wave 
of reform was introducing new remuneration schemes and the shift away from FFS 
payments. 
1.7.3 Theoretical Background of Financial Incentives 
Remuneration schemes link physicians to patients, insurers, or government health plans 
through incentive contracts  [64]. A health plan (the principal) gives incentives to 
encourage quality physician (the agent) performance [64]. Incentives range from explicit 
incentives like targeted bonuses for achieving performance standards to implicit 
incentives like remuneration method. Physician behaviour is affected by their payment 
method, which is designed to provide high agent rewards at low cost to the principal [64]. 
Economic theory of physician behavior posits that physicians want to maximize their 
income while still providing acceptable patient care and will attempt to do so by altering 
practice size, working hours, visit duration and time per patient [65]. However other 
factors, such as intrinsic motivation to care for patients or desire for work-life balance, 
may also affect practice patterns. 
Physicians practicing in FFS systems receive a fee for each service provided. Since their 
income is dependent on the volume of services provided, there is an incentive to provide 
more services and treat high-use patients [65]. Economic theory suggests that FFS 
systems align patient and physician interests: the patient seeks the best possible medical 
service and physician seeks to maximize profits by providing more services [66]. In 
practice best medical care differs between patients and some patients may not wish to 
access the healthcare system at all. Quality of care is high in FFS practices according to 
patient and physician satisfaction [67,68]. Neither physician nor patient has an incentive 
to restrict health care utilization, which puts the principal at risk for increasing health care 
expenditures [64,66].   
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In capitation systems, physicians receive set payments for each patient to provide 
treatment. Capitation schemes improve efficiency because there’s no incentive to provide 
unnecessary services and many contracts stipulate that payments are reduced if patients 
seek care outside of the practice. Capitation rates may be age, sex and/or risk adjusted, 
but physicians still risk attracting less healthy patients. The amount necessary to provide 
quality care for a patient may be more or less than actual capitation payments, which 
shifts the financial risk from the principal to the agent [64,65]. The failure to motivate 
quality care is an example of the principal-agent problem, and physicians may under 
provide if gaps exist between physician financial interest and patient medical interests 
[64,66]. If capitation rates are not risk-adjusted, physicians may seek to maximize income 
by cream skimming, or enrolling many low-risk patients that will require little care [66]. 
While comprehensiveness of care may be impacted, capitation systems may achieve 
better continuity of care because physicians have incentives to maintain long-lasting 
relationships [66]. Capitation systems may encourage physicians to provide preventive 
care services and health promotion to reduce future services needed by their patients [69]. 
A recent systematic review of the literature suggested that payment method affects 
physician behaviour [69]. FFS physicians are more productive and treat sicker patients, 
whereas capitation improves efficiency [64,69]. These findings are supported by evidence 
from Ontario. FFS physicians conduct 29% more visits than their non-FFS counterparts 
[70]. However there was no significant difference in total hours worked per week 
between FFS and other remuneration schemes [71]. Physicians practicing in FHNs 
provided slightly fewer services than those in FHGs, but continuity of care was similar in 
both models [59]. Capitation-based practices in Ontario have wealthier patients with 
fewer comorbidities than FFS based models, which is likely a result of capitation rates 
not being adjusted for risk [60].  
The problems of FFS and capitation systems may be addressed with blended payment 
models, which combine fixed and variable payments [64,65]. In blended capitation 
models, physicians receive their primary income from capitation payments to cover a 
core basket of services for enrolled patients. Variable income is generated by full FFS 
payments for all services provided to non-enrolled patients and non-core services 
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provided to enrolled patients. These payments encourage broader scope of practice [64]. 
Some systems encourage enrolling sicker patients with fractional FFS payments for all 
core services [64].  Pay-for-performance programs may also generate variable income. 
Physicians practicing in Ontario’s FHNs and FHOs are primarily reimbursed by 
capitation payments, but receive additional variable income for providing non-core 
services, P4P incentives and other incentives. In such models, physicians are encouraged 
to provide efficient services while maintaining a broad scope of practice and high quality 
of care [64]. Ontario’s FHGs are an example of a blended FFS model: enhanced FFS 
payments are combined with explicit incentives like preventive care bonuses, 
comprehensive care fees and diabetes management incentives. 
Bonuses are direct incentives that aim to change physician behaviour [72]. Pay-for-
performance (P4P) schemes are explicit financial incentives to deliver services at high 
quality levels. Various P4P schemes have been introduced worldwide based on the theory 
that they are the most efficient way of achieving high-quality, equitable care [73]. 
Ontario’s Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus is typical of most P4P programs where 
physicians receive additional payments for delivering specified levels of service. 
Performance based payments aim to reduce variations in delivery of service and increase 
productivity [73]. The rationale for P4P schemes is they may resolve the principal-agent 
problem by aligning physician and patient interests [74]. If quality of care affects 
financial success, then physicians will devote more time and resources to achieving such 
levels of quality. High-performing physicians will be rewarded and low-performing 
physicians will be motivated to improve performance; however bonuses may fail to affect 
physician behaviour if there is no negative consequence for underperformance [72]. 
1.7.4 Ontario’s Reformed Primary Care Delivery Models 
There are ten primary care enrolment models (PEM), but this discussion is limited to 
three: Family Health Networks (FHN), Family Health Groups (FHG) and Family Health 
Organizations (FHO). The remuneration schemes of the new models differ somewhat, but 
have some common commitments and incentives. Practices must have a minimum of 
three physicians and provide after-hours care. Formal enrolment of patients is strongly 
encouraged; however patients are not required to enroll, and physicians cannot refuse a 
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patient enrolment based on their health or service needs. Rostering a patient formalizes 
the patient-physician relationship; patients commit to seek treatment from their 
physician’s practice and physicians commit to providing comprehensive care. The 
Unattached Patient Fee is a one-time incentive to enroll new patients. Physicians receive 
a monthly comprehensive care fee for each rostered patient in addition to their primary 
funding. Other incentives exist for seeing patients after hours, achieving targeted levels of 
preventive care services and chronic disease management.  
Two blended capitation models were introduced: the Family Health Network (FHN) in 
2002 and Family Health Organization (FHO) in 2007. Physicians receive monthly age- 
and sex-adjusted capitation payments for each rostered patient to cover a basket of core 
services. The FHO base rate payment is greater than the FHN rate, but the basket of core 
services is much greater. In addition to capitation payments, physicians receive a 
percentage of FFS payments for core services provided to rostered patients, and full FFS 
payments for all services provided to non-enrolled patients and non-core services 
provided to enrolled patients. Access Bonuses are additional payments and reduced dollar 
for dollar when rostered patients seek core services outside the group practice. 
In 2003 the blended FFS Family Health Group (FHG) was introduced. Physicians receive 
full FFS payments and premiums for after-hours care and comprehensive fee codes. Like 
physicians in capitation-based models, FHG physicians also receive monthly 
comprehensive care fee for their rostered patients and targeted incentives.  
A primary care team is not a funding model, but an interdisciplinary practice model. 
Family Health Teams (FHTs) consist of professionals from different disciplines, such as 
physicians, nurse practitioners, dieticians, pharmacists and social workers. In contrast, a 
traditional practice usually consists of physicians, office assistants and occasionally 
nurses. Primary care teams in Ontario were first established with CHCs in 1979 and then 
expanded with FHTs in 2005. CHCs focus on hard-to-serve populations, whereas FHTs 
offer patients access to different types of health care providers in one place. FHTs receive 
a global budget from the MOHLTC, which funds everything except physician services 
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and some clinical and support staff of FHT physicians. FHT physicians bring their own 
funding through a FHN or FHO, but must meet all PEM and FHT requirements. 
The MOHLTC introduced Cumulative Preventive Care Bonuses in 2006 to increase 
delivery rates of preventive care services. Eligible PEM physicians may claim an annual 
bonus for achieving targeted levels of preventive care services among their enrolled 
patients in the following categories: influenza vaccinations, childhood immunizations, 
colorectal cancer screening, mammography and Pap smears. The Pap smear bonus is 
based on the percentage of a physician’s target population that have been screened for 
cervical cancer in the 30 months prior to March 31st of the fiscal year when the bonus is 
being claimed. The target population for cervical cancer screening includes all enrolled 
female patients aged 35 to 69 years except women with history of hysterectomy or 
screening for cervical diseases that preclude regular Pap smear testing. There are five 
bonus levels corresponding to stepped achieved compliance rates. Physicians achieving 
65% compliance receive a $220 bonus and those achieving 80% or higher receive $2,200. 
The primary care landscape in Ontario has shifted greatly in the past ten years. The new 
PEMs proved attractive, as the average payments per active physician in a PEM were 
higher than FFS physicians [75]. In 2002, the majority (94%) of family physicians 
practiced in traditional FFS models [52]. By 2012, only 24% practiced in FFS 
arrangements and 76% of family physicians practiced in one of the new models [52]. 
FHGs were the most popular PEM until the end of 2010 when FHOs became the most 
common PEM [75,76]. Delivery of primary care also shifted away from a physician 
focus, with the number of physicians practicing in interdisciplinary primary health teams 
growing from 176 to over 3,000 between 2000 and 2012 [62]. The majority (2,400) of 
physicians joined one of the province’s 200 FHTs [62]. Patient enrolment increased from 
only 600,000 enrolled patients province-wide in 2002 to 9.9 million, or 73% of the 
provincial population, in 2012 [62]. 
1.7.5 Evidence on the Effectiveness of Financial Incentives 
The impact of financial incentives on delivery of preventive care or effectiveness for 
improving performance measures has not been clearly demonstrated. The literature is 
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inconsistent and many studies are plagued with methodological issues. Few studies have 
assessed the impact of incentives with randomized controlled trials (RCT), and the 
majority of available evidence comes from weaker designs such as controlled before and 
after studies (CBA) or observational studies. Design limitations limit the ability to assess 
the impact on health outcomes, so instead process indicators or intermediate outcomes 
are reported. A theme amongst the evidence is that studies with weaker designs report 
greater effect sizes than those with stronger designs [76]. Comparing results form various 
studies is not always appropriate because of differences in incentive type, health care 
system or setting. Therefore the study context and its relevance to the Ontario health care 
system is must be considered when reviewing the evidence [77,78]. 
1.7.5.1 Remuneration/Implicit Incentives 
There is some evidence suggesting that primary payment method influences physician 
visit patterns and service volume, but the effects on quality and comprehensiveness of 
care remain a concern [69]. Physicians reimbursed with capitation payments provide 
more efficient service than those in FFS practices, but observing and verifying quality of 
care remains a challenge [69]. In theory, capitation systems deliver improved preventive 
care but there is scarce empirical evidence to support this claim [65]. Evidence suggests 
that alternative payment methods (capitation or salary) are associated with greater 
provision of preventive care [79], but there is limited empirical evidence on the effect on 
remuneration scheme on cancer screening. 
 A Scottish study evaluated the effect of a new reimbursement contract for Pap smears on 
screening rates [80]. Physicians were formerly paid for each Pap performed, but the new 
contract linked remuneration to meeting performance targets of 50% and 80% [80]. 
Within six months of introducing the new contract, screening coverage increased from 
78% to 85%  (p < 0.05) [80]. However the effect of temporal trend cannot be ruled out 
since there was no comparison group. 
Health maintenance organizations (HMO) and managed care plans in the US provide 
some insight on delivery of preventive care in capitation-based models, but are not 
generalizable to the Canadian system. Enrollees in HMOs are more likely to receive 
15 
 
preventive care services [81,82].  Cervical screening rates are statistically higher among 
patients of fully-capitated Medicaid managed care plans than those in the Medicaid FFS 
program (71% versus 39%; p < 0.0001) [83]. Similarly, greater proportions of HMO 
enrollees receive Pap smears and mammograms than patients enrolled in traditional 
indemnity plans [84,85]. Increased coverage of screening and preventive services may 
have contributed to earlier stage cancer diagnoses of Medicare HMO enrollees than FFS 
enrollees [86]. Compared to non-enrollees, HMO members were less likely to be 
diagnosed with regional or distant cervical cancer (OR: 0.34; 95% CI 0.21 – 0.56), distant 
breast cancer (OR: 0.73; 95% CI 0.57 – 0.94), regional breast cancer (OR: 0.78; 95% CI 
0.69 – 0.87) and regional colon cancer (OR: 0.85; 95% CI 0.75 – 0.96) [86]. American 
evidence supports the theory that preventive care is more likely in capitation models, 
however this different may reflect improved insurance coverage rather than quality 
[81,82]. Therefore evidence from a mixed-payer system doesn’t necessarily reflect what 
will occur under universal health care. 
Evidence from Ontario suggests that capitation-based practices may deliver better 
preventive care than FFS based practices. Dahrouge et al. (2012) [87] calculated 
preventive care scores from chart audits of the following manoeuvres: cervical, breast 
and colorectal cancer screening, influenza immunizations, and visual and auditory 
impairment screening. After adjusting for physician and patient characteristics, FHN 
practices had significant higher preventive care scores than FFS based (traditional FFS 
and FHG) practices or established capitation (HSO) [87]. During the study period, only 
FHN practices were eligible for preventive care bonuses, which may have biased the 
effect of funding model [87]. However including practice organizational factors in the 
model showed that practice characteristics were the primary determinants of preventive 
care scores rather than funding model [87]. This study failed to meet sample size 
requirements, which may explain the finding of no effect when including all independent 
variables in the model [87]. The importance of organizational factors is supported on 
delivery is supported by the findings of Thind et al. (2008) [88]. Preventive care scores 
were significantly higher among practices participating in a PEM than those that weren’t 
(OR: 1.58; p = 0.032) [88] Since both studies used prevention scores across several 
measures, the effect on individual manoeuvres cannot be determined. 
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In contrast, Jaakimainen et al. (2011) [89] examined delivery rates of individual 
preventive services before and after joining a FHN or FHG. Participation in cervical 
cancer screening increased by 1.9% (p < 0.001) after joining a FHG and 4.6% (p < 0.001) 
after joining a FHN [89].  Among physicians joining a FHG, mammography rates 
decreased by 3.3% (p < 0.001); however rates increased by 2.4% (p < 0.001) among 
physicians that joined a FHN [89]. After joining a FHG and FHN, FOBT screening rates 
increased by 3.2% (p < 0.001) and 7.4% (p < 0.001), respectively [89]. Overall cervical 
and colorectal screening rates were not different between FHGs and FHNs; however 
overall mammography rates were significantly higher among FHNs [79]. The authors 
noted that statistically significant differences might not be meaningful at a population 
health level because sample sizes were very large [89]. Secular trends for cancer 
screening were already increasing, which may account for a significant portion of all of 
the observed increases [89]. Without a traditional FFS comparison group or analysis from 
multiple time points, observed uptake cannot be unequivocally attributed as a model 
effect [89].  
Kralj et al. (2013) [90] compared provider behaviour of physicians that switched from a 
FHG to FHO with physicians remaining in FHGs to assess the effect of capitation. 
Physicians that switched provided 6-7% fewer visits and services per day, but worked 
similar hours [90]. Switching physicians were more likely to receive each type of 
preventive care bonus and about 10% more likely to receive one for Pap smear coverage 
[90]. This indirect measure suggests that joining a capitation is associated with improved 
delivery [90]. These results suggest that capitation is more efficient without comprising 
quality. 
1.7.5.2 Explicit Incentives 
The empirical evidence of the effectiveness of explicit financial incentives on physician 
behaviour is also inconclusive. The effect of P4P incentives for all performance measures 
has been estimated as a modest improvement of 5% [77]. Improvements have been 
reported for process and intermediate clinical outcomes for chronic diseases, but the 
evidence on cancer screening is less consistent. Two systematic reviews found 
insufficient evidence to support the use provider incentives for increasing cancer 
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screening [36,39]. However a more recent systematic review suggested Incentives could 
have a modest effect and that more evidence was needed [78]. While some studies report 
significant effects of P4P programs, the effect sizes are usually modest and 
methodological quality issues often limit their interpretation. Similarly, it is often hard to 
determine if findings of no effect are due to program or study design flaws. 
There have been two RCTs that assessing the impact of bonuses or P4P programs on 
cancer screening uptake and both found no effects [91,89]. Hillman et al. (1998) [91] 
evaluated a tournament style bonus program to improve cancer screening referrals among 
women in Medicaid managed care plans in the USA. Primary care sites randomized to 
the intervention group were eligible to receive group bonuses worth up to 20% of plan 
capitations [91]. During the 18-month study period referrals for breast, cervical and 
colorectal cancer screening increased, but there were no significant between-group 
differences [91]. Grady et al. (1997) [92] evaluated the effects of reminders, audit and 
feedback, and incentives on mammography referral and compliance rates. American 
family practices were randomized to the following groups: education (control), education 
plus cue enhancement with chart stickers, and education plus cue enhancement plus 
feedback and rewards (incentive) [92]. Physicians in the incentive group received a $50 
bonus if they achieved a 50% referral rate [92]. During the one year study period, the 
incentive group’s referral and compliance rates increased by 26% and 17.9%, 
respectively [92]. Control referral and compliance rates were significantly lower than 
both intervention groups, but since there were no differences between intervention group 
rates, the effect was attributed to the reminder intervention [92]. Both trials had short 
study periods and small sample sizes, which may have influenced the finding of no effect. 
The designs of these P4P programs have been criticized as having insufficiently sized 
bonuses to be effective and poor program awareness among physicians [41]. Therefore 
the finding of no effect may be due to weak study design, a poorly planned incentive 
program or a combination of both. 
There are many pay-for-performance programs implemented by various health insurance 
plans in the USA. Results from different programs are mixed and difficult to compare 
due to program, plan and population differences. Lack of standardization across different 
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programs places an administrative burden on providers eligible for bonuses that may not 
be worth the payout [93]. The results of programs run by PacifiCare, the Integrated 
Health Association (IHA) of California, Physician Quality and Service Recognition 
(PQSR) program and Blue Cross Blue Shield Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) are 
discussed below. 
Medical groups in California were exposed to two P4P contracts over the past decade: 
PacifiCare’s Quality Improvement Program (QIP) and the IHA’s P4P contract. Both 
programs have been evaluated using a CBA design using a comparison group of medical 
groups in the Pacific Northwest contracted to the same health plans that were unexposed 
to incentives [94,95]. The QIP, launched in July 2003, enabled physicians to receive 
quarterly bonuses of $0.625 per plan member for meeting or exceeding clinical targets in 
the following areas: cervical cancer screening, mammography, HbA1c testing among 
diabetics and two other measures [94]. In the program’s second year, a second 
performance tier worth twice as much was added. In July 2004, the IHA bonus program 
began and the same medical groups could receive bonuses for performance in the same 
performance areas as the QIP for members of five other health plans [95]. Incentives 
varied slightly between different health plans, but performance scores were based on 
clinical quality measures, patient experience and adopting IT to support care (Pink 2006). 
The IHA greatly expanded the bonus potential for physicians by about ten times for the 
average medical group [95]. Rosenthal et al. (2005) [94] reported the results of 
PacifiCare’s QIP program, and Mullen et al. (2010) [95] reported findings from the IHA 
scheme. During the QIP’s first year, Pap smear and mammography rates increased by 
5.3% (p < 0.001) and 1.9% (p < 0.04), respectively [94]. Compared to controls, Pap 
smear rates increased by 3.6 percentage points more (p < 0.02), but there was no 
significant difference in mammography rates [94]. Low performing physicians had the 
greatest response to the incentive program, increasing screening rates by 11.1% [95]. 
However about 75% of payments went to physicians already achieving target levels 
raising the question that targets were set too low to achieve a meaningful increase [56]. 
The effect of QIP may be biased due to physician exposure to the IHA [51,56,57]. 
Medical groups were aware that the IHA would begin the following year and anticipatory 
effects may overestimate the QIP effect [39,95]. Indeed Mullen et al. (2010) [95] 
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reported no significant effects on performance in the period when physicians were only 
exposed to the QIP. In the first year of the IHA, an increase in Pap smear rates of 3.5 
percentage points more than controls suggests that the findings of Rosenthal et al. (2005) 
[94] reflect the IHA effect [95]. The results of both studies show the importance of 
incentive size. 
The PQSR program in Hawaii is a voluntary P4P program for generalists and specialists 
with Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) contracts. Bonuses are awarded by rankings 
of composite score of all program components [96]. Participating physicians received 
between 1 and 5% of their base professional fees in 1998-2001 and up to 7.5% from 2002 
onwards [96]. In 2001, an additional bonus was added for significant performance 
improvement [96]. Chen et al. (2010) [97] analyzed rates of cervical, breast and 
colorectal screening of physicians in the first four years after joining the program. 
Physicians with PPO contracts and without P4P incentives from outside Hawaii were 
used as a comparison group [97]. The increase in cervical screening between program 
years one and two was 6.6 percentage points greater for P4P physicians than the 
comparison group (p < 0.001) [97]. The difference-in-difference was 1.4 percentage 
points (p < 0.001) between years two and three, which suggests P4P is more effective 
during its first year [97]. However the impact on colorectal rates were delayed. The rate 
of increase in the P4P group was significantly lower than that of the control group until 
the last year of the program when this finding was reversed [97]. The program had little 
effect on mammography rates, which changed by less than 1% per year [97]. The greater 
improvements were observed in low performing physicians, who increased Pap smear 
rates by 13.6%, 0.5% and 7.4% each year [97]. Results from the PQSR must be 
interpreted with caution for several reasons. Data from before the program started was 
not available to assess the effect of temporal trends [96]. Risk of selection bias is high in 
voluntary programs and cannot be ruled out without pre-program rates. Gilmore et al. 
(2007) [96] tried to account for selection bias by comparing the previous year’s 
performance rates for physicians that joined after program year one with those that did 
not join in a given year. Physicians that joined in 1999 had significantly higher 
performance in 1998 for cervical (p = 0.03), colorectal (p = 0.03) and breast cancer 
screening (p = 0.003) than physicians that did not join [96]. When interpreting the results 
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of Chen et al. (2010) [96], it’s important to consider the limitations of using comparison 
data that differs by year and region. It’s possible that the P4P and control groups 
experienced different regional and secular trends that weren’t controlled for. Considering 
the limitations of the comparison and that no pre-program trends were reported, it’s 
unclear if increased screening rates were a result of the program or existing trends. 
The Alternative Quality Contract (AQC) of Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts is a 
modified global payment model where physician groups and hospitals are at full or 
partial risk for spending beyond negotiated budgets [98]. Annual payments to groups are 
linked to per member per month budgets, which cover all services to plan enrollees 
regardless of where they receive their care [98]. Groups under budget keep some or all of 
the surpluses, while those over budget are responsible for some or all deficits [98]. 
Participating groups are eligible for quality incentive payments worth up to 5% of total 
per member per month payments for performance on 32 ambulatory care measures and 
services [98]. Screening rates increased for breast, cervical and colorectal cancer after 
program implementation [99]. Compared to physician groups that did not enter the 
contract, there was significant improvement for breast cancer screening in program years 
one and two, but the effects were modest [99,100]. There was no significant effect on 
cervical or colorectal cancer screening compared to the control group over the first two 
years [100].  
Significant improvements in colorectal screening rates are reported after initiating an 
annual bonus program for private insurance plan members [101]. The bonus formula is 
proprietary, so no details on bonus eligibility, method of calculation or incentive 
magnitude were provided. Since Armour et al. (2004) [101] were unable to determine 
which physicians were eligible, only those receiving bonuses were included in the 
analysis. After program year one, fecal occult blood testing (FOBT) increased by 2.8% (p 
< 0.01) and overall colorectal screening increased by 3% (p < 0.01) [101]. Since there 
was no control group, the temporal effect of change cannot be clearly distinguished from 
that of the bonuses [101].  
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Gavagan et al. (2010) [102] compared screening rates of six community health centres 
participating using financial incentives with those at five centres without bonuses. If a 
clinic met two of three quality indicator targets then all clinic physicians received a bonus 
[102]. The maximum bonus was $4,000 per year, representing 3 – 4% of a physician’s 
salary [102]. Mammography and cervical cancer rates increased over the four-year study 
period, but there were no significant differences between clinics with incentives and 
without [102]. Significantly higher proportions of non-incentivized clinics met Pap smear 
targets early in the study period, but this trend was reversed during the later quarters of 
the study period [102]. These results suggest the incentive effect may be delayed, but 
overall there were no significant differences in performance rates of Pap smears or 
mammography between incentivized and non-incentivized clinics [102]. Features of the 
incentive program may have caused finding of no effect. Group incentive programs are 
unlikely to be as effective as incentives for individual physicians, and individual 
physician productivity bonuses may have been more of an incentive [102]. Participating 
physicians reported that bonuses were the least effective quality improvement 
intervention, which may be due to insufficient incentive size [102]. Physicians were 
aware of the program, but not told which indicators were incentivized to avoid selective 
performance improvements [102]. About 50% of physicians were unable to correctly 
identify the incentivized indicators, so lack of program knowledge may have contributed 
to findings of no effect [102]. The study period was only 18 months, but practices may 
take longer to adjust to the program. In addition to program limitations, this study’s small 
sample size meant it was only powered to detect a very large effect size [102]. 
A Dutch P4P program designed by primary care providers led to quality improvements 
for some clinical indicators, but not for Pap smears [103]. Physician groups were 
awarded bonuses for performance in three quality areas: clinical care indicators, patient 
management and patient experience Improvement [103]. The study timeframe was only 
one year, but the cervical screening interval is usually three years. A year may have been 
too short to cause an effect. The greatest improvements were reported for low-performing 
indicators, so the baseline rate may have been too high to cause much of an effect [103]. 
Since group bonuses were awarded based on performance scores in over 30 clinical 
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indicators, it’s possible that the bonus size was too small to cause an effect in many 
indicators.  
An Australian P4P program with per patient bonuses for under screened women and 
those screened over target reported short-term increases in cervical cancer screening for 
all physicians [104]. There was no significant association between increased screening 
rates and participating in the program or claiming bonuses, which suggests that screening 
rates were already increasing [104]. There is high risk of selection bias in this study as 
participation in the program was voluntary; already high-performing physicians may have 
chosen to join the program [104]. Participating physicians reported that the program 
didn’t modify their practice and the burden of tracking and billing incentive codes was 
greater than the amount of the bonus [104].  
Interestingly one study found removing targeted incentives was more impactful on Pap 
smear coverage than introducing them [105]. Screening only increased by 0.6% during 
the two years it was incentivized and decreased by 1.6% yearly over the next five years 
when incentives were removed [105]. Rates then began to increase when incentives were 
reintroduced [105]. 
The few preliminary before and after studies assessing the impact of preventive care 
bonuses on rates of targeted services in Ontario have reported modest effects. Li et al. 
(2014) [106] used a difference-in-difference approach to control for selection bias to 
compare rates of preventive care services between physicians eligible for bonuses and 
FFS physicians. Preventive care bonuses increased Pap smear and colorectal cancer 
screening rates by 3.1% and 9.5%, respectively [106]. There was no significant difference 
in mammography rates [106]. Bonuses increased absolute levels of compliance by 4.1% 
(p < 0.01), 1.8% (p < 0.01) and 8.5% (p < 0.01) for Pap smears, mammography and 
colorectal cancer screening, respectively [106]. Compared to baseline compliance, Pap 
smear, mammography and colorectal cancer screening rates increased by 7%, 2.8% and 
57%, respectively [106]. The parallel trend test failed to reject the null hypothesis of a 
common trend between physicians eligible for P4P and non-P4P physicians for Pap 
smears, but the null hypothesis was rejected for mammography and colorectal cancer 
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screening [106]. However results from the differential trend model are not qualitatively 
different from the fixed-effects model [106]. Subgroup analyses revealed greater 
responses among physicians with lower baseline compliance [106], which is consistent 
with the findings of Chen et al. (2010) [96] and Rosenthal et al. (2005) [94]. The 
incentive effect also varied with physician age and practice size with younger physicians 
and larger practices having a greater response [106].  
The Provider and Patient Reminders in Ontario: Multi-Strategy Prevention Tools (P-
PROMPT) project found similar modest results [107]. After one year of the project, time-
appropriate delivery of Pap smears and mammography increased by 6.26% (95% CI 5.12 
– 7.45) and 5.3% (95% CI 4.2 – 6.4), respectively [107]. The proportion of practices with 
Pap smear coverage less than 60% decreased from 25% to 14%, and the proportion at the 
highest performance level (<80%) increased from 31.5% to 55.6% [107]. Nurse 
practitioners were deployed to some clinics, but comparable rates were observed for 
clinics with and without nurse practitioners [107]. There are several limitations of that 
limit the findings of Kaczorowki et al. (2013) [107]. The P-PROMPT project evaluated a 
complex intervention including patient and provider reminders, deployment of nurse 
practitioners and P4P bonuses, so the effect of incentives cannot be distinguished from 
the co-interventions [107]. Furthermore, physicians survey responses indicate that other 
aspects of the project, like reminder letters, were more useful for improving compliance 
[108]. There was no contemporaneous control group, so improvements may be due in 
part or whole to temporal trends. 
1.7.6 Cost-Effectiveness 
The cost-effectiveness of financial incentives for improving cancer screening has not 
been investigated to date. A few economic analyses have evaluated pay-for-performance 
programs and implicit financial incentives for improving other process of care outcomes 
or intermediate outcomes. However few full economic analyses exist, and the incentives 
and outcomes of these studies are not relevant to this analysis.  
Bonus programs are often not cost-effective because previously high-performing 
physicians must also be rewarded to cause change among those not meeting performance 
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targets [72]. Depending on baseline performance and the structure of the P4P program, 
the physicians previously meeting targets may receive the majority of bonus payments. It 
is argued that explicit incentives are unsustainable since they add new costs to the 
healthcare system when costs are already increasing [72]. However if expected savings 
resulting from bonus-induced performance improvements are used to fund reward 
payments then the program may be cost-effective.  
Cancer screening was one of the first interventions to have a systematic cost-
effectiveness analysis [109] and over the past 40 years studies of the cost-effectiveness of 
cervical cancer screening continue to be published. The reductions of the incidence and 
mortality of cervical cancer after introducing Pap smears clearly demonstrated the 
effectiveness of screening. However it was not clear at what ages women should be 
screened or the interval length between screens. Cost-effectiveness analyses of screening 
details have informed development of screening guidelines and programs [109]. With the 
advent of new technologies such as liquid-based cytology and HPV DNA testing, recent 
analyses have focused on the most cost-effective test. To date no there have been no cost-
effectiveness analyses of physician payment method or bonuses on cancer screening. 
Early economic analyses reported that screening programs increase total cervical cancer-
related costs, but also improve health effects like life-years gained [110]. Despite lower 
terminal treatment costs, the increases in diagnostic costs leads to greater total costs 
[110]. Factors like screening ages, interval and attendance rates all influence the cost-
effectiveness of a screening program [111]. Identical programs with higher attendance 
rates result in greater health effects and total costs, but costs increase less than 
proportional to that of attendance [111]. Therefore programs with higher screening rates 
are more cost-effective than those with lower attendance [111,112]. 
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1.8 Research Objectives 
I aim to contribute to the growing body of evidence on financial incentives for improving 
cancer screening performance. Three research objectives are: 
1. Assess the difference in cervical cancer screening rates across three of Ontario’s 
primary care delivery models: 
a. Compare the traditional FFS model with the Family Health Group (FHG), 
which is an enhanced FFS model eligible for P4P incentives. 
b. Compare the traditional FFS model with the FHO, which is a capitation 
model eligible for P4P incentives. 
c. Compare the FHG and FHO models, which are both eligible for P4P 
incentives, but have different base remuneration schemes. 
2. Estimate the overall and specific healthcare costs associated with cervical cancer 
treatment in Ontario during the first three years after diagnosis. 
3. Conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of remuneration and P4P eligibility for 
cervical cancer screening in Ontario’s primary care delivery models. 
Screening rates of Ontario FFS, FHG and FHO physicians were assessed from 
population-based administrative databases held at the Institute for Clinical Evaluative 
Sciences (ICES). Physician practice screening rates from 2010/2011 were adjusted for 
patient and physician characteristics and compared across models. Costs were assessed 
using ICES administrative data holdings for a cohort of Ontario cervical cancer cases 
diagnosed between 2007 and 2010. Costs were estimated for the first three years 
following cervical cancer diagnosis and adjusted for censoring. A microsimulation model 
was developed from published natural history models and parameterized to Canada HPV 
prevalence and cervical cancer incidence rates. This model was populated using 
screening rates assessed in objective 1 and costs assessed in objective 2. 
  
26 
 
1.9 References 
1. Mohar A, Frias-Medivil M. Epidemiology of cervical cancer. Cancer Invest. 
2000;18(6):584-90. 
2. Duarte-Franco E, Franco EL. Cancer of the uterine cervix. BMC Womens Health. 
2004;4 (Suppl 1):S13. 
3. de Villiers EM, Fauquet C, Broker TR, Bernard HU, zur Hausen H. Classification of 
papillomaviruses. Virology. 2004;324(1):17-27. 
4. Lorincz AT, Reid R, Jenson AB, Greenberg MD, Lancaster W, Kurman RJ. Human 
papillomavirus infection of the cervix: relative risk associations of 15 common 
anogenital types. Obstet Gynecol. 1992;79(3):328-37. 
5. Doorbar J. Molecular biology of human papillomavirus infection and cervical cancer. 
Clin Sci (Lond). 2006;110(5):525-41. 
6. Castellsague X. Natural history and epidemiology of HPV infection and cervical 
cancer. Gynecol Oncol. 2008;110(3 Suppl 2):S4-7. 
7. McMurray HR, Nguyen D, Westbrook TK, McAnce DJ. Biology of human 
papillomavirus. Int J Exp Pathol. 2001;82(1):15-33. 
8. Moscicki AB, Schiffman M, Burchell A, Albero G, Giuliano AR, Goodman AT, et al. 
Updating the natural history of human papillomavirus and anogenital cancers. 
Vaccine. 2012;30(Suppl S):F24-33. 
9. Moore DH. Cervical cancer. Obstet Gynecol. 2006;107(5):1152-61. 
10. Gien LT, Beauchemin MC, Thomas G. Adenocarcinoma: a unique cervical cancer. 
Gynecol Oncol. 2010;116(1):140-6. 
11. Franco EL, Duarte-Franco E, Ferenczy A. Cervical cancer: epidemiology, prevention 
and the role of human papillomavirus infection. CMAJ. 2001;164(7):1017-25.  
12. Morrison EA. Natural history of cervical infection with human papillomaviruses. Clin 
Infect Dis. 1994;18(2):172-80. 
13. Ferlay J, Shin H-R, Bray F, Forman D, Mathers C, Parkin DM. Estimates of 
worldwise burden of cancer in 2008: GLOBOCAN 2008. Int J Cancer. 
2010;127:2893-2917. 
14. Jemal A, Bray F, Center MM, Ferlay J, Ward E, Forman D. Global cancer statistics. 
CA Cancer J Clin. 2011;61(2):69-90. 
15. Canadian Cancer Society’s Advisory Committee on Cancer Statistics. Canadian 
Cancer Statistics 2013. Toronto, ON: Canadian Cancer Soceity; 2013.  
27 
 
16. Ahktar-Danesh N, Elit L, Lytwyn A. Trends in the relative survival among women 
with cervical cancer in Canada: a population-based study. Int J Gynecol Cancer. 
2012;22(7):1208-1213. 
17. Ahktar-Danesh, N, Lytwyn A, Elit L. Trends in mortality indices among 
gynaecological cancer patients in Canada. Gynecol Oncol. 2012;127:620-624. 
18. Dickinson JA, Stankiewicz A, Popadiuk C, Pogany L, Onysko J, Miller AB. Reduced 
cervical cancer incidence and mortality in Canada: national data from 1932 to 2006. 
BMC Public Health. 2012;12:992. 
19. Murphy J, Kennedy EB, Dunn S, McLachlin M, Fung Kee Fung M, Gzik D, et al. 
Cervical screening: a guideline for clinical practice in Ontario. J Obstet Gynaecol 
Can. 2012;34(5):453-8. 
20. Canadian Task Force on Preventive Health Care. Recommendations on screening for 
cervical cancer. CMAJ. 2013;185(1):35-45. 
21. Quinn M, Babb P, Jones J, Allen E. Effect of screening on incidence of and mortality 
from cancer of cervix in England: evaluation based on routinely collected statistics. 
BMJ. 1999;318:904-8. 
22. Peto J, Gilham C, Fletcher O, Matthews FE. The cervical cacner epidemic that 
screening has prevented in the UK. Lancet. 2004;364:249-56. 
23. Schiffman M, Castle PE, Jeronimo J, Rodriguez AC, Wacholder S. Human 
papillomavirus and cervical cancer. Lancet. 2007;370(9590):890-901. 
24. Cancer Care Ontario. Ontario Cervical Screening Program 2012 Report. Toronto, 
Canada, 2014. 
25. Elit L, Saskin R, Raut R, Elliott L, Murphy J, Marrett L. Sociodemographic factors 
associated with cervical cancer screening coverage and follow-up of high grade 
abnormal results in a population-based cohort. Gynecol Oncol. 2013;128(1):95-100. 
26. Qi V, Phillips SP, Hopman WM. Determinants of a healthy lifestyle and use of 
preventive screening in Canada. BMC Public Health. 2006;6:275. doi: 10.1186/1471-
2458-6-275. 
27. Hsia J, Kemper E, Kiefe C, Zapka J, Sofaer S, Pettinger M, et al. The importance of 
health insurance as a determinant of cancer screening: evidence from the women’s 
health initiative. Prev Med. 2000;31(3):261-70. 
28. Elit L, Schultz SE, Przubysz R, Wilton AS, Urbach DR, Simunovic M. Institute for 
Clinical Evaluative Sciences. Surgery for Cervical Cacncer. In: Urbach DR, 
Simunovic M, Schulz SE, editors. Cancer Surgery in Ontario. ICES Atlast. Toronto: 
Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences; 2008. 
28 
 
29. Lukka H, Hirte H, Fyles A, Thomas G, Fung Kee Fung M, Johnston M, et al. Primary 
treatment for locally advanced cervical cancer: concurrent platinum-based 
chemotherapy and radiation. Toronto (ON): Cancer Care Ontario; 2004 Jun [In 
review 2011]. Program in Evidence-based Care Practice Guideline Report No.:4-5. 
IN REVIEW. 
30. Hirte HW, Strychowsky JE, Oliver T, Fung-Kee-Fung M, Elit L, Oza A, et al. 
Chemotherapy for recurrent, metastatic, or persistent cervical cancer. Toronto (ON): 
Cancer Care Ontario; 2006 Jul 5 [In review 2-11]. Program in Evidence-based Care 
Practice Guideline Report No.:4-20. IN REVIEW. 
31. Elit L, Fyles AW, Devries C, Oliver TK, Fung-Kee-Fung M. Gynecology Cancer 
Dsiease Site Group. Follow-up for women after treatment for cervical cancer. 
Toronto (ON): Cancer Care Ontario; 2009 Apr 13. Program in Evidence-based Care 
Evidence-Based Series No.:4-16. IN REVIEW. 
32. Andrae B, Kemetli L, Sparen P. Screening-preventable cervical cancer risks: 
evidence from a nationwide audit in Sweden. J Natl Cancer Inst. 2008;100(9):622-9. 
33. Spayne J, Ackerman I, Milosevic M, Seidenfeld A, Covens A, Paszat L. Invasive 
cervical cancer: a failure of screening. Eur J Public Health. 2008;18(2):162-5. 
34. Macgregor JE, Campbello MK, Mann EMF, Swanson KY. Screening for cervical 
intraepithelial neoplasia in north east Scotland shows fall in incidence and mortality 
from invasive cancer with concomitant rise in preinvasive disease. BMJ. 
1994;308(6941):1407-1411. 
35. Brouwers MC, De Vito C, Bahirathan L, Carol A, Carroll JC, Cotterchio M, et al. 
What implementation interventions increase cancer screening rates? A systematic 
review. Implement Sci. 2011;6:111. 
36. Sabatino SA, Lawrence B, Elder R, Mercer SL, Wilson KM, DeVinney B, et al. 
Effectiveness of interventions to increase screening for breast, cervical and colorectal 
cancers: nine updated systematic reviews for the guide to community preventive 
services. Am J Prev Med. 2012;43(1):97-118. 
37. Coughlin SS, Breslau ES, Thompson T, Benard VB. Physician recommendation for 
Papanicolaou testing among U.S. women, 2000. Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev. 
2005;14(5):1143-8. 
38. Baron RC, Melillo S, Rimer BK, Coates RJ, Kerner J, Habarta N, et al. Intervention 
to increase receommendation and delivery of screening for breast, cervical and 
coloredtal cancers by healthcare providers: a systematic review of provider 
reminders. Am J Prev Med. 2010;38(1):110-117. 
39. Scott A, Sivey P, Ait Ouakrim D Willenberg L, Naccarella L, Furler J, et al. The 
effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care 
physicians. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2011;(9):CD008451. 
29 
 
40. Emmert M, Eijkenaar F, Kemter H, Esslinger AS, Schoffski O. Economic evluation 
of pay-for-performance in health care: a systematic review. Eur J Health Econ. 
2012;13:755-767. 
41. Rosenthal MB, Frank RG. What is the empirical basis for paying for quality in health 
care? Med Care Res Rev. 2006;63(2):135-157. 
42. Starfield B. Primary Care: balancing health needs, services and technology. 1998 
Oct 29. Oxford University Press, USA. 
43. Starfield B, Shi L, Macinko J. Contribution of primary care to health systems and 
health. Milbank Q. 2005;83(3):457-502. 
44. Stoddard JJ, St. Peter RF, Newacheck PW. Health insurance status and ambulatory 
care for children. N Engl J Med. 1994 May 19;330(20):1421-1425. 
45. Berk ML, Schur CL, Cantor JC. Ability to obtain health care: recent estimates from 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation National Access to Care Study. Health Aff 
(Millwood). 1995 Fall;14(3):139-146. 
46. Bindman AB, Grumbach K, Osman D, Komaromy M, Vranizan K, Lurie N, et al. 
Preventable hospitalizations and access to health care. JAMA. 1995 Jul 26;274:305-
11. 
47. Lambrew JM, Defriese GH, Carey TS, Ricketts TC, Biddle AK. The effects of 
having a regular doctor on access to primary care. Med Care. 1996 Feb;34(2):138-
151. 
48. Gorey KM, Luhainaah IN, Holowaty EJ, Fung KY, Hamm C. Associations of 
physician supplies with breast cancer stage at diagnosis and survival in Ontario, 1988 
to 2006. Cancer. 2009 Aug 1;115(15):3563-70. 
49. Hussey PS, Anderson GF, Osborn R, Feek C, McLaughlin V, Millar J, et al. How 
does the quality of care compare in five countries? Health Aff. 2004 May;23(3):89-
99. 
50. Campbell RJ, Ramirez AM, Perez K, Roetzheim RG. Cervical cancer rates and the 
supply of primary care physicians in Florida. Fam Med. 2003 Jan;35(1):60-4. 
51. Dahrouge S, Hogg W, Russell G, Geneau R, Kristjansson E, Muldoon L, et al. The 
Comparison of Models of Primary Care in Ontario (COMP-PC) study: methodology 
of a multi-faceted cross-sectional practice-based study. Open Med. 2009;3(3):149-
164. 
52. Hutchison B, Glazier R. Ontario’s primary care reforms have transformed the local 
care landscape, but a plan is needed for ongoing improvement. Health Aff 
(Millwood). 2013 Apr;32(4):695-703. 
30 
 
53. Aggarwal M, Hutchison B. Canadian Foundation for Healthcare Improvement. 
Toward a Primary Care Strategy for Canada. Ottawa (ON): Canadian Foundation for 
Healthcare Improvement;2012 December. 
54. Blendon RH, Schoen C, Doneland K, Osborn R, DesRoches CM, Scoles K, et al. 
Physicians’ views on quality of care: a five-country comparison. Health Aff. 2001 
May;20(3):233-243. 
55. Anderson GF, Hussey PS. Multinational Comparisons of Health Systems Data, 2000. 
Commonwealth Fund; 2000.  
56. Frogner BK, Anderson GF. Multinational Comparisons of Health Systems, 2005. 
Commonwealth Fund; 2006. 
57. Canadian Institute for Health Information. Supply, distribution, and migration of 
Canadian physicians, 2000. Ottawa, ON: CIHI; 2001. 
58. Chan BTB, Schultz SE. Supply and utilization of general practitioner and family 
physician services in Ontario. ICES Investigative Report. Toronto: Institute for 
Clinical Evaluative Sciences; 2005. 
59. Glazier RH, Klein-Geltink J, Kopp A, Sibley LM. Capitation and enhanced fee-for-
service models for primary care reform: a population-based evaluation. CMAJ. 2009 
May 26;180(11):E72-E81. 
60. Glazier RH, Kopp A, Schultz SE, Kiran T, Henry DA. All the right intentions but 
few of the desired results: lessons on access to primary care from Ontario’s patient 
enrolment models. Healthc Q. 2012;15(3):17-21. 
61. Hutchison B, Abelson J, Lavis J. Primary care in Canada: so much innovation, so 
little change. Health Aff. 2001;20(3):116-131. 
62. College of Family Physician of Canada. The CFPC National Family Physician 
Survey: Summary Report. Toronto, ON: CFPC; 1998. 
63. Pringle D, Levitt C, Horsburgh ME, Wilson R, Whittaker MK. Interdisciplinary 
collaboration and primary health care reform statement from the Ontario Chairs of 
Family Medicine and the Council of Ontario University Programs in Nursing. Can 
Fam Physician. 2000 Apr;46:763-5,771-4. 
64. Robinson JC. Theory and practice in the design of physician payment incentives. 
Milbank Q. 2001;79(2):149-77, III. 
65. Devlin RA, Sarma S, Hogg W. Remunerating primary care physicians: emerging 
directions and policy options for Canada. Healthc Q. 2006;9(3):34-42. 
66. Buchanan A. Principal/agent theory and decision making in health care. Bioethics. 
1988 Oct;2(4):317-33. 
31 
 
67. Brudevold C, McGhee SM, Ho LM. Contract medicine arrangements in Hong Kong: 
an example of risk-bearing provider networks in an unregulated environment. Soc 
Sci Med. 2000 Oct;51(8):1221-9. 
68. Nadler ES, Sims S, Tyrance PH Jr, Fairchild DG, Brennan TA, Bates DW. Does a 
year make a difference? Changes in physician satisfaction and perception in an 
increasingly capitated environment? Am J Med. 1999 Jul;107(1):38-44. 
69. Gosden T, Forland F, Kristiansen IS, Sutton M, Leese B, Giuffrida A, et al. Impact 
of payment method on behavior of primary care physicians: a systematic review. J 
Health Serv Res Policy. 2001 Jan;6(1):44-55. 
70. Sarma S, Devlin RA, Hogg W. Physician’s production of primary care in Ontario, 
Canada. Health Econ. 2010 Jan;19(1):14-30. 
71. Sarma S, Devlin RA, Belhadji B, Thind A. Does the way physicians are paid 
influence the way they practice? The case of Canadian family physicians’ work 
activity. Health Policy. 2010 Dec;98(2-3):203-17. 
72. Custers T, Hurley J, Klazinga NS, Brown AD. Selecting effective incentive 
structures in health care: a decision framework to support health care purchasers in 
finding the right incentives to drive performance. BMC Health Serv Res. 2008;8:66. 
73. Maynard A. The powers and pitfalls of payment for performance. Health Econ. 2012 
Jan;21(1):3-12. 
74. Eldridge C, Palmer N. Performance-based payment: some reflections on the 
discourse, evidence and unanswered questions. Health Policy Plan. 2009 
May;24(3):160-6. 
75. Henry DA, Schultz SE, Glazier RH, Bhatia RS, Dhalla IA, Laupacis A. Payments to 
Ontario physicians from Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care Sources, 1992/93 
to 2009/10. ICES Investigative Report. Toronto: Institute for Clinical Evaluative 
Sciences; 2012. 
76. Glazier RH, Zagorski BM, Rayner J. Comparison of primary care models in Ontario 
by demographics, case mix and emergency department use, 2008/09 to 2009/10. 
ICES Investigative Report. Toronto, ON: Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences; 
2012. 
77. Eijkenaar F, Emmert M, Scheppach M, Schoffski O. Effects of pay for performance 
in health care: a systematic review of systematic reviews. Health Policy. 2013 
May;110(2-3):115-30. 
78. Brouwers MC, C DV, Bahirathan L, Carol A, Carroll JC, Cotterchio M, et al. What 
implementation interventions increase cancer screening rates? A systematic review. 
Implement Sci. 2011 Sep 29;6:111. 
32 
 
79. Hutchison B, Woodward CA, Norman GR, Abelson J, Brown JA. Provision of 
preventive care to unannounced standardized patients. CMAJ. 1998 Jan 
27;158(2):185-93. 
80. Reid GS, Robertson AJ, Bissett C, Smith J, Waugh N, Halkerston R. Cervical 
screening in Perth and Kinross since the introduction of the new contract. BMJ. 1991 
Aug 24;303(6800):447-50. 
81. Dudley RA, Miller RH, Korenbrot TY, Luft HS. The impact of financial incentives 
on quality of health care.. Milbank Q. 1998;76(4):649-86, 511. 
82. Miller RH, Luft HS. HMO plan performance update: an analysis of the literature, 
1997-2001.. Health Aff (Millwood). 2002 Jul-Aug;21(4):63-86. 
83. Roohan PJ, Butch JM, Anarella JP, Gesten F, Shure K. Quality measurement in 
Medicaid managed care and fee-for-service: the New York State experience. Am J 
Med Qual. 2006 May-Jun;21(3):185-91. 
84. Wang YR, Pauly MV. Difference in the use of preventive services between fee-for-
service plans and HMOs: is more better? Am J Manag Care. 2003 Apr;9(4):293-301. 
85. Retchin SM, Brown B. The quality of ambulatory care in Medicare health 
maintenance organizations. Am J Public Health. 1990 Apr;80(4):411-5. 
86. Riley GF, Potosky AL, Lubitz JD, Brown ML. Stage of cancer at diagnosis for 
Medicare HMO and fee-for-service enrollees. Am J Public Health. 1994 
Oct;84(10):1598-604. 
87. Dahrouge S, Hogg WE, Russell G, Tuna M, Geneau R, Muldoon LK, et al. Impact of 
remuneration and organizational factors on completing preventive manoeuvres in 
primary care practices. CMAJ. 2012 Feb 7;184(2):E135-43. 
88. Thind A, Feightner J, Stewart M, Thorpe C, Burt A. Who delivers preventive care as 
recommended? Analysis of physicians and practice characteristics. Can Fam 
Physician. 2008 Nov;54(11):1574-5. 
89. Jaakimainen RL, Barnsley J, Klein-Geltink J, Kopp A, Glazier RH. Did changing 
primary care delivery models change performance? A population based study using 
health administrative data. BMC Fam Pract. 2011 Jun 3;12:44. 
90. Kralj B, Kantarevic J. Quality and quantity in primary care mixed-payment models: 
evidence from family health organizations in Ontario. Can J Econ. 2013 Feb 
2;46(1):208-238. 
91. Hillman AL, Ripley K, Goldfarb N, Nuamah I, Weiner J, Lusk E. Physician financial 
incentives and feedback: failure to increase cancer screening in Medicaid managed 
care. Am J Public Health. 1998 Nov;88(11):1699-701. 
33 
 
92. Grady KE, Lemkau JP, Lee NR, Caddell C. Enhancing mammography referral in 
primary care. Prev Med. 1997 Nov-Dec;26(6):791-800. 
93. Shaman H. What you need to know about pay for performance. Healthc Financ 
Manage. 2008 Oct;62(10):92-6. 
94. Rosenthal MB, Frank RG, Epstein AM. Early experience with pay-for-performance: 
from concept to practice. JAMA. 2005 Oct 12;294(14):1788-93. 
95. Mullen KJ, Frank RG, Rosenthal MB. Can you get what you pay for? Pay-for-
performance and the quality of healthcare providers. Rand J Econ. 2010 
Spring;41(1):64-91. 
96. Gilmore AS, Zhao Y, Kang N, Ryskina KL, Leogorreta AP, Taira DA, et al. Patient 
outcomes and evidence-based medicine in a preferred provider organization setting: 
a six-year evaluation of a physician pay-for-performance program. Health Serv Res. 
2007 Dec;42(6 Pt 1):64-91. 
97. Chen JY, Kang N, Juarez DT, Hodges KA, Chang RS, Leogorreta AP. Imapct of a 
pay-for-performance program on low performing physicians. J HealthC Qual. 2010 
Jan-Feb;31(1):13-21. 
98. Chernew ME, Mechanic RE, Landon BE, Safran D. Private-payer innvoation in 
Massachusetts: the 'alternative quality contract'. Health Aff (Millwood). 2011 
Jan;30(1):51-61. 
99. Song Z, Safran DG, Landon BE, He Y, Ellis RP, Mechanic RE, et al. Health care 
spending and quality in year 1 of the alterntaive quality contract. N Engl J Med. 2011 
Sep 8;365(10):909-18. 
100. Song Z, Safran DG, Landon BE, Landrum MB, He Y, Mechanic RE, et al. The 
'Alternative Quality Contract,' based on a global budget, lowered clinical spending 
and improved quality. Health Aff (Millwood). 2012 Aug;31(8):1885-94. 
101. Armour BS, Friedman C, Pitts MM, Wike J, Alley L, Etchason J. The influence of 
year-end bonuses on colorectal cancer screening. Am J Manag Care. 2004 
Sep;10(9):617-24. 
102. Gavagan TF, Du H, Saver BG, Adams GJ, Graham DM, McCray R, et al. Effect of 
financial incentives on improvement in medical quality indicators for primary care. J 
Am Board Fam Med. 2010 Sep-Oct;23(5):622-31. 
103. Kirschner K, Braspenning J, Akkermans RP, Jacobs JE, Grol R. Assessment of a 
pay-for-performance program in primary care designed by target users. Fam Pract. 
2013 Apr;30(2):161-71. 
104. Greene J. An examination of pay-for-performance in general practice in Australia. 
Health Serv Res. 2013 Aug;48(4):1415-32. 
34 
 
105. Lester H, Schmittdiel J, Selby J, Fireman B, Campbell S, Lee J, et al. The impact of 
removing financial incentives from clinical quality indicators: longitudinal analysis 
of four Kaiser Permanente indicators. BMJ. 2010 May 11;340:c1898. 
106. Li J, Hurley J, Decicca P, Buckley G. Physician response to pay-for-performance: 
evidence from a natural experiment. Health Econ. 2014;23(8):962-78. 
107. Kaczorowski J, Hearps SJC, Lohfeld L, Goeree R, Donald F, Burgess K, et al. Effect 
of provider and patient reminders, deployment of nurse practitioners, and financial 
incentives on cervical and breast cancer screening rates. Can Fam Physician. 2013 
Jun;59:e282-9. 
108. Kaczorowski J, Goldberg O, Mai V. Pay-for-performance incentives for preventive 
care: views of family physicians before and after participation in a reminder and 
recall project (P-PROMPT). Can Fam Physician. 2011 Jun;57(6):690-6. 
109. Wagner JL. Cost-effectiveness of screening for common cancers. Cancer Metastasis 
Rev. 1997 Sep-Dec;16(3-4):281-94. 
110. Koopmanschap MA, Lubbe KT, van Oortmarssen GJ, van Agt HM, van 
Ballegooijen M, Habbema JK. Economic aspects of cervical cancer screening. Soc 
Sci Med. 1990;30(10):1081-7. 
111. Koopmanschap MA, van Oortmarssen GJ, van Agt HM, van Ballegooijen M, 
Habbema JD, Lubbe KT. Cervical-cancer screening: attendance and cost-
effectiveness. Int J Cancer. 1990 Mar 15;45(3):410-5. 
112. Gyrd-Hansen D, Holund B, Andersen P. A cost-effectiveness analysis of cervical 
cancer screening: health policy implications. Health Policy. 1995 Oct;34(5):35-51. 
 
 
35 
 
Chapter 2  
2 Financial Incentives and Cervical Cancer Screening 
Participation in Ontario’s Primary Care Delivery Models 
2.1 Introduction 
Cervical cancer is the third most commonly diagnosed cancer in women worldwide and 
ranks 11
th
 in Canada [1-3].
1
  Following the introduction of universal health insurance in 
Canada in the early 1970s, uptake of cervical cancer screening with the Papanicolaou 
(Pap) test increased considerably [3]. Between 1972 and 2006 cervical cancer incidence 
and mortality rates declined by 58% and 71% and these reductions are largely attributed 
to higher screening participation [3]. It takes several years for infection with human 
papillomavirus (HPV) to progress to invasive cervical cancer, so with timely screening 
and follow-up of abnormal test results, many cancer cases and deaths are preventable [5]. 
Despite the progress in cervical cancer screening, it was estimated that 610 women were 
diagnosed with and 150 women died from cervical cancer in Ontario in 2013 [4]. Among 
incident cases in Ontario, nearly 40% had no record of screening within the four years 
prior to diagnosis [6].  
Ontario guidelines recommend that women who are or ever have been sexually active 
between 21 and 69 years be screened with a Pap smear every three years [7-9]. In 2009-
2011 only 65% of women aged 20-69 were screened, which is well below the provincial 
target rate of 85% [8]. Women who are never or inadequately screened have increased 
risks of cervical cancer, advanced cancer and cervical cancer-related mortality [10-12]. 
Thus, failure to screen at the recommended interval presents a serious health challenge 
for women and costs the health care system significantly. Primary care physicians, thus, 
play an instrumental role in educating patients on the risks of cervical cancer and benefits 
of screening with Pap tests. 
                                                 
1
 The 2008 global cervical cancer age-standardized incidence rate (ASIR) and age-standardized mortality 
rate (ASMR) were 15.2 and 7.8 per 100,000 women, respectively [1]. The 2013 Canadian ASIR and 
ASMR were 7 and 1.6 per 100,000 women, respectively [4]. 
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In an effort to improve delivery of preventive health care services by primary care 
physicians, the government of Ontario introduced primary care reforms in the early 
2000s. Financial incentives for physicians and the mode of physician remuneration were 
two mechanisms by which the government of Ontario aimed to improve the delivery and 
uptake of a basket of preventive care services. After a transition period when physicians 
quit the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) model, the Family Health Group (FHG) and the 
Family Health Organization (FHO) models emerged as Ontario’s dominant primary care 
delivery models [13-15]. A detailed comparison of model differences is described in 
Appendix A2.1. In brief, the FHG is an enhanced FFS model where physicians submit 
billing claims as in the traditional FFS model. The FHO is a blended capitation model 
that reimburses physicians with age- and sex-adjusted capitation payments to provide a 
set of services. FHO physicians are incentivized to submit shadow billings -- they receive 
15% of the FFS payment for each core service submitted. In addition to base 
remuneration, FHG and FHO physicians receive several incentives that are not available 
to physicians practicing in the traditional FFS model [16].  
A key incentive eligible to physicians practicing in FHGs or FHOs is the Pap smear 
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus. This pay-for-performance (P4P) program rewards 
physicians each year with stepped payments based on the proportion of their enrolled 
patients aged 35 to 69 years who received a Pap smear in the 30 months prior to March 
31
st
 of that fiscal year. Women who have had hysterectomies are excluded from the target 
population. Physicians that have 60% of their patients screened receive a $220 bonus, and 
physicians achieving the highest performance level (80%) receive $2,200. Table 2.1 
summarizes the payments for each target coverage level.  
Despite the increasing popularity of incentive-based payments to physicians to achieve 
desirable health outcomes worldwide, the effectiveness of incentives is ambiguous [17-
19].  Some studies have found that financial incentives are associated with a modest 
(<10%) improvement in cervical cancer screening rates, while others have found no 
effects [20,21]. The evidence on the effect of remuneration is quite limited. Some studies 
suggest that capitation-based practices deliver better preventive care compared to FFS 
counterparts [22], but the effects of blended payment models are unclear to date [13].  
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The objectives of this study are to compare cervical cancer screening rates in three of 
Ontario’s primary care delivery models by incentive eligibility and remuneration. I 
compared the traditional FFS model with the FHG, an enhanced FFS model where 
physicians receive incentives if they meet target participation levels. I also compared the 
FFS model with the FHO, where physicians are paid on a capitation basis and may 
receive other incentives. Finally I compared the FHG and FHO models, both of which are 
eligible for incentives, but have different base remuneration. Secondary objectives 
include estimating the direct medical care costs of screening across the three primary care 
delivery models: FFS, FHG and FHO.  
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Data Sources 
The data for this study came from population-based Ontario health administrative 
databases held at the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (ICES). These datasets 
were linked using unique, encoded identifiers and analyzed at ICES. A cross-sectional 
analysis of a population-based cohort was conducted. The Corporate Provider Database 
(CPDB) contains information on physicians practicing in Ontario and program eligibility. 
The ICES Physician Database (IPDB) contains physician demographic characteristics. 
The Registered Persons Database (RPDB) holds demographic information on all Ontario 
residents eligible for the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP). The OHIP claims 
database contains all billing claims and shadow billing claims made by all Ontario 
physicians. The Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) tables were used to identify 
patients rostered to physicians practicing in a FHG or FHO. Patients of physicians 
practicing in a FFS practice were identified from OHIP claims using a validated ICES 
algorithm [23].
2
  Statistics Canada’s Postal Code Conversion File [24] was used to assign 
                                                 
2
 The practice populations of FFS physicians are defined by claims submitted for primary care visits. All 
patients that the physician billed OHIP for at least one visit in the previous fiscal year and any additional 
patients with at least one visit in each of the two previous fiscal are assigned to that physician. If patients 
meet these criteria for more than one physician, they are assigned to the physician with the most claims in 
the most recent year. If the numbers of claims are equal across physicians then the patient is assigned to the 
physician with the most recent visit. 
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patients to census dissemination areas (DAs), which were then linked to the Ontario 
Marginalization Index (OMI) and the Rurality Index of Ontario (RIO) [25]. The OMI 
captures neighbourhood socio-economic factors across four dimensions: material 
deprivation, residential instability, dependency and ethnic concentration [26]. Each 
dimension is a composite of several indicators from the 2006 census (Appendix A2.2), 
and data from each dimension is organized into quintiles where 1 is least marginalized 
and 5 is most marginalized.
3
 Individuals with a RIO of 40 or higher were considered to 
reside in rural areas [25]. 
2.2.2 Study Physicians and Study Patients 
All full-time comprehensive primary care physicians (PCPs) practicing in a FHG, FHO 
or traditional FFS model on March 31st, 2011 were included [27]. This date was chosen 
to be consistent with the date used to calculate bonus payments and capture the most 
recent data available. Ontario women aged 35 to 69 years inclusive on the index date that 
were patients of FFS physicians or enrolled to FHG or FHO physicians were first selected 
for inclusion.
4
 Women were excluded from the study population if there was evidence of 
previous gynaecological cancer diagnoses in the Ontario Cancer Registry (OCR). The 
OCR is a population-based registry that captures information on all Ontarians with 
incident cancer cases except non-melanoma skin cancer. The Canadian Institute for 
Health Information Discharge Abstract Database (CIHI-DAD) holds information on all 
inpatient hospitalizations and was used to exclude women with evidence of hysterectomy. 
Women with evidence of infection with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in the 
ICES HIV database [28] were also excluded because they have increased risk of cervical 
cancer and are precluded from regular screening [29]. 
                                                 
3
 Areas in quintile 1 are the least deprived, least unstable with respect to housing, least dependent and have 
low ethnic concentrations. Quintiles 1 and 2 represent areas with the highest socioeconomic status and 
socioeconomic status decreases with increasing quintile. Areas in quintile 5 are the most deprived, unstable 
and dependent, and have the highest ethnic concentrations. 
4
 Note that women aged 21 to 34 years are eligible for screening, but were not part of the target population 
for the cumulative preventive care bonus. 
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Patient and physician-level characteristics were obtained on the index date (March 31st, 
2011). Patient characteristics included age, rural residence and OMI quintiles. Physician 
characteristics included age, gender, experience (defined as years since graduation), 
international medical graduate (IMG) status and number of patients in the Pap smear 
bonus target population.  
Patient-level screening status was assessed from the OHIP claims database using a 
validated billing code algorithm [30].
5
 A woman was considered adequately screened if 
at least one OHIP claim with a Pap smear billing code was made in the 30 months prior 
to March 31st, 2011, as specified by the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus guidelines. 
The screening rate was defined as the number of eligible women receiving a Pap smear 
divided by all eligible women in the corresponding physician’s practice. 
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonuses claimed for Pap smears were identified from OHIP 
claims. Physicians are responsible for calculating their coverage level and submitting 
bonus claims to OHIP. The Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care sends each eligible 
physician a Target Population Service Report, which defines the target population for 
each bonus category. For Pap smears this includes all enrolled women aged 35 to 69 
inclusive on March 31st of a given year. Women who have had a hysterectomy are 
excluded. The Target Population Service Report, clinical records and other data sources 
are used to identify which women were screened in the coverage period, and the coverage 
level is calculated by dividing the number of women covered by the target population. 
Documentation of services provided is not required for submission. 
2.2.3 Analyses 
Bivariate analyses using ANOVA and the Chi-square statistic where appropriate were 
used to compare patient- and physician-level characteristics across model types and to 
assess the associations between these characteristics and screening rates. The associations 
                                                 
5
 Patients with at least one procedure, lab or applicable visit code billed to OHIP were considered 
adequately screened. 
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between physician-level factors and claiming a bonus among FHG and FHO physicians 
were also assessed using ANOVA and the Chi-square statistic. 
Physician practice-level screening rate was the primary outcome of this study. Patient-  
and physician-level covariates that were available from administrative databases were 
included. However dependency and physician age were excluded because they were 
highly correlated with material deprivation and physician experience, respectively. 
Patient-level characteristics were aggregated to the physician’s practice. Mean patient age 
and the proportion of a physician’s practice living in rural areas were calculated. 
Socioeconomic status and ethnicity were estimated by calculating the proportion practice 
patients living in quintiles 1 and 2 (least marginalized) in the following dimensions: 
material deprivation, residential instability and ethnic concentration. The influence of the 
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus was assessed by comparing screening rates of FFS 
with FHG physicians. In these two models physicians receive FFS payments, but only 
FHG physicians are eligible for bonuses. The influence of remuneration (capitation 
versus FFS) was assessed by comparing screening rates of FHG and FHO physicians. 
Finally, performance of FFS physicians was compared to FHO physicians to assess the 
overall impact of incentives and remuneration on screening rates and costs. 
Since the outcome variable, screening rate in physician’s practice, is bounded between 
zero and one the fractional logit regression model was considered [31]. I used a 
generalized linear model with a binomial distribution and logit link function, so predicted 
screening rates of 0% and 100% were attainable. Three fractional logit models were fit to 
compare different pairs of primary care delivery models: 1) FFS with FHG 2) FHO with 
FHG and 3) FFS with FHO. The dependent variable was physician-level screening rate 
and the exposure variables of interest are the primary care delivery models. Patient-level 
variables, physician gender, physician experience and number of patients in the Pap 
smear target population were controlled (Box 2.1). Each regression model was fit using 
data from physicians practicing in one of the two models being compared (i.e. regression 
model 1 comparing FFS with FHG was fit using data from FFS and FHG physicians). 
Marginal effects were obtained using the method of recycled predictions where predicted 
screening rates are generated after fixing the values of primary care program model (e.g. 
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in regression model 1 fix program to 0 for FFS to generate predictions and then fix 
program to 1 for FHG to generate predictions) [32]. The predictions are then averaged to 
estimate the conditional mean of a particular primary care model [32]. Regression 
analyses were performed for the cohort and sensitivity analyses was conducted with 
physicians with at least 100 eligible patients. 
The costs of cervical cancer screening in Ontario were estimated in two steps: 1) 
estimating delivery costs; and 2) estimating bonus costs for FHG and FHO physicians. 
First, the service cost, exclusive of bonus payments, for Pap smear delivery was obtained 
from Ontario’s schedule of fees and benefits [33]. Both the procedure fee ($6.75) and 
laboratory fee ($11.55) were included in delivery costs [33]. It was assumed that all Pap 
smears were performed outside of hospital and thus eligible for the laboratory fee. 
Procedure codes are not eligible for payment when billed in conjunction with a 
consultation, but it was assumed that the unit cost of all Pap smears would equal the rate 
listed in the provincial fee schedule ($18.30). Pap smears are included of the basket of 
services covered by base capitation payments in the FHO model, so FHO physicians 
don’t receive the same fee as FFS or FHG physicians. However FHO physicians receive 
the laboratory fee if performed outside of hospital and it was also assumed that the Pap 
smear procedure fee is built into capitation payments. Therefore the unit cost of $18.30 
was assigned to the FHO and delivery costs, excluding bonus payments, were the same 
across all models. I assumed that the number of women screened over the study period 
was distributed evenly. Thus, the number of women screened each year was estimated by 
dividing the total screened by three (the number of years of coverage). Annual Pap smear 
delivery costs were estimated by multiplying the number screened annually by the unit 
cost. The second step in estimating the costs of screening was to estimate the overall and 
per woman cost of bonuses paid to physicians. In the FHG and FHO models, the bonus 
payments claimed by physicians in 2010/2011 were summed to obtain total bonus 
payments, which were added to delivery costs to estimate the total costs of screening in a 
given year. The cost per screen was estimated by dividing the total annual cost by the 
annual number screened. 
All analyses were performed using SAS 9.2 at ICES Western. 
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2.3 Results 
There were 7,382 full-time comprehensive primary care physicians practicing in a FFS, 
FHG or FHO model on March 31st, 2011. Fifty-eight physicians did not have any 
patients that met eligibility criteria and were excluded from further analyses. Twenty-six 
physicians listed as FFS physicians claimed a bonus in 2011. Since FFS physicians 
cannot claims bonuses, their primary care delivery model could not be accurately 
identified and they were also excluded. The remaining 7,298 physicians had a total of 
2,083,633 female patients aged 35-69 eligible for cervical cancer screening. Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 summarize the characteristics of patients and physicians across model type.  
Overall 80% of women had at least one Pap smear between 2009 and 2011. Seventy-
three per cent of FFS patients, 79% of FHO patients and 84% of FHG patients were 
screened at least once Bivariate analysis suggested that each patient- and physician-level 
characteristic was associated with patient-level screen status (Appendix A2.3). The mean 
screening rate per physician was 79% across all three models; 72% among FFS 
physicians, 79% among FHO physicians and 83% among FHG physicians (Figure 2.1a). 
Primary care model type remained a statistically significant predictor of screening rate 
after adjusting for patient- and physician-level characteristics (Appendix A2.4). 
Screening rates of FHG physicians were 7.7% higher (p < 0.0001) than those of FFS 
physicians (Table 2.4; Figure 2.1b). Compared to FHO physicians, rates of FHGs were 
2.3% higher (p < 0.0001; Figure 2.1c). Adjusted performance of FHO physicians was 
6.2% higher than that of FFS physicians (p < 0.0001; Figure 2.1d). Results from 
sensitivity analyses of physicians with at least 100 eligible patients were similar to those 
from the whole  cohort.   
Fifty-six per cent of FHG and 81% of FHO physicians claimed a Cumulative Preventive 
Care Bonus for Pap smear delivery in 2010/11 (Table 2.5). Sixty-five per cent of 
physicians claiming a bonus claimed the highest award level. There were significant 
associations between claiming a bonus and all physician characteristics (Appendix A2.5). 
In total $7.195 million in bonuses were paid to family physicians in FHGs and FHOs in 
the 2010/11 fiscal year.  
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The total one-year costs of cervical cancer screening ranged from $965,764 in the FFS 
model to $9,498,350 in the FHO model. The FFS model has the lowest cost per woman 
screened (the unit cost of $18.30) and adjusted screening rate (Table 2.6; Figure 2.2). The 
costs per woman screened, including bonus payments, in the FHG and FHO models were 
$29.71 and $35.02, respectively. 
2.4 Discussion 
In 2000-2002 cervical cancer screening participation among eligible Ontario women aged 
20-69 was 61.6% [9]. Reforms to Ontario’s primary care system began in 2002, leading 
to a transition period when physicians were joining the new patient enrolled models, 
which stabilized around 2010 [13,14]. Previous research showed that in the first two 
years after joining a FHG, the cervical screening rate increased by 1.9% (p < 0.001), 
while among physicians joining the blended capitation Family Health Network (FHN) 
model the screening rate increased by 4.6% (p < 0.001) [33]. The provincial screening 
rate among women aged 20-69 steadily increased by 2.4% (p < 0.0001) since 2002 and 
by 2008-2010 had improved to 72% [35].  
My results show significant differences in cervical cancer screening rates between FFS 
and two dominant reformed models in Ontario. These findings suggest that physician 
payment method and incentives may affect Pap smear delivery. Screening rates were 
significantly higher among FHO physicians, who receive FFS payments and are eligible 
for incentives, compared to FFS physicians, suggesting that financial incentives 
combined with a FFS payment scheme would achieve higher cervical screening rates. 
The theoretical effect of remuneration on preventive services is unclear. FFS physicians 
have an incentive to provide a high volume of services, which could include cervical 
screening [36,37]. Physicians in capitation systems may have an incentive to reduce 
services because they do not receive reimbursement for additional services [36,37]. 
However physicians paid under capitation may also try to reduce future care needed by 
their patients and minimize financial risk by providing preventive care and health 
promotion activities [38-40]. My results show that physicians in a blended capitation 
system have significantly higher cervical screening participation than those in the FFS 
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model. Blended systems like the FHO attempt to combine incentives from FFS and bonus 
payments for providing higher quality care [38-40].  
My results are generally consistent with past research suggesting that P4P incentives have 
modest effects on cervical cancer screening rates [41]. Compared to the FFS model, 
FHGs and FHOs have 7.7% and 6.2% higher screening rates. A previous analysis of 
financial incentives in Ontario estimated that the bonus increased Pap smear delivery by 
7% [25]. Another Ontario study found no difference in screening trends before and after 
the introduction of the incentive [42]. In addition, patients who enrolled in a FHG or 
FHO were more likely to receive cancer screening before incentives were introduced 
[42]. These findings suggest that observed differences in screening participation rates 
between the incentivized models (FHG and FHO) and FFS model may be due to higher 
baseline rates. This in turn may suggest that P4P incentives could be ineffective. It should 
be noted that I found poor agreement between physician screening participation rate and 
bonus claimed for FHG and FHO physicians. While many physicians claimed a bonus 
that matched their observed screening rate, there were many physicians that did not claim 
any or the full bonus corresponding to their observed screening rate. There were also 
many physicians who claimed a bonus higher than that corresponding to their observed 
rate. This may be due to insufficient bonuses, practice culture, administrative burden of 
claiming a bonus, and the accuracy in calculations of screening rates by physicians when 
claiming a bonus and in my estimates from administrative data. Bonuses claimed by 
physicians rather than those corresponding to their observed rate were used to estimate 
costs because these payments reflect the true cost to the ministry. While some physicians 
may be claiming upwards, currently there is no mechanism for the ministry to audit 
bonus claims. 
The empirical evidence on the effect of remuneration for cancer screening has not been 
widely studied. An analysis of preventive care delivery in Ontario after joining a 
reformed model reported that cervical screening rates among physicians joining FHNs 
were 1% higher than those joining FHGs [33]. Another Ontario study reported that FHO 
physicians were 10% more likely to claim a Pap smear preventive care bonus, which 
suggests that they achieve higher screening rates [13]. This is consistent with my finding 
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that greater proportions of FHO physicians claimed bonuses than FHG physicians, and 
FHO physicians were 45% more likely to claim a bonus than FHG physicians (relative 
risk (RR) = 1.45, 95% confidence interval (CI): 1.40-1.51). Previous research suggesting 
that capitation performs better is not consistent with my finding since FHOs had slightly 
lower rates than FHGs. This may be due to underestimating FHO rates or a true 
difference. Pap smears are included in the basket of FHO services, so a physician 
receives a fraction of the fee paid to FFS or FHG physicians for providing a Pap smear. It 
is plausible that FHO physicians do not consider this payment worth the administrative 
burden of submitting a shadow billing claim, which may underestimate my estimates of 
FHO screening rates. 
There are several reasons why a woman may choose not to be screened for cervical 
cancer. Women may not be aware of the risks of cervical cancer or the benefits of 
screening, and they may not perceive themselves to be at risk of developing cervical 
cancer. Pyschosocial barriers to screening include embarrassment, fear of Pap testing, 
lack of a female provider to perform testing and cultural beliefs about cervical cancer and 
screening [43]. Despite the best efforts of a woman’s physician, some women may 
choose to not participate. 
This analysis has several strengths. My results contribute to the literature on the role of 
remuneration on quality of care and provide updated estimates on the influence of 
incentives on cervical cancer screening in Ontario. These analyses highlight the impact of 
incentives on physician behaviour by estimating practice screening rate as an outcome 
rather than individual screening status as an outcome variable. Financial incentives are 
directed towards physicians not patients, so their impact on clinical practice is 
meaningful at the physician level rather than at the patient level. My analysis examines 
the influence of incentives across different primary care delivery models in contrast to 
previous research that considered all models eligible for incentives as one group [27,32]. 
I examined both performance and costs to get a better understanding of the impact of 
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus program on cervical cancer screening.  
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This analysis also has several limitations. First, I was unable to assess temporal trends in 
cervical cancer screening rates. Second, as previously mentioned, if FHO physicians do 
not submit shadow billings my estimates of screening rates in this model may be biased 
downward. FHO physicians not affiliated with a hospital receive the full laboratory fee 
and in theory would submit these claims, which would limit the degree to which my 
results underestimate FHO rates. Third, it was assumed that Pap smear delivery costs 
(excluding bonus payments) in the FHO model were equal to those in the FFS and FHG 
models to simplify calculating the costs of screening. However this assumption may not 
hold true in some practices depending on a woman’s use of the healthcare system. For 
example, the proportion of capitation payments attributed to screening would be higher 
for a woman who only sees her primary care physician once every three years for a Pap 
test than a sicker woman who sees her physician monthly. Without knowing the 
healthcare utilization of FHO patients, I was unable to assess the impact of this 
assumption on my screening cost estimates. Fourth, the switch from the FFS practice to a 
FHG or FHO was voluntary; physicians joining a FHG or FHO may differ systematically 
by provider behaviour or other unknown physician characteristics. Although I controlled 
for several physician and patient characteristics, there may be some selection bias. 
Physicians joining a FHG had greater productivity before joining than those that did not 
switch [44] and physicians joining FHG or FHO had higher baseline screening rates than 
those remaining in the FFS model [40]. Physicians with complex and less affluent 
patients were more likely to join a FHG than remain in the FFS model [44] or join a 
capitation-based model [45]. Differences in baseline screening, productivity and patient 
populations may bias my results. Fifth, I was unable to assess socio-economic status or 
ethnicity at the patient-level as only neighbourhood-level data was available. Low 
income, certain ethnic groups (e.g. South Asian women) and recent immigration status 
are associated with a lack of screening [30,46], so individual-level data on these variables 
would have been preferable to include in the model. Finally, my screening estimates are 
about 15% higher than those reported by the Ontario Cervical Screening Program 
(OCSP) for the same time period [9], which may suggest that my rates are overestimated. 
However this difference could be due to differences in study populations. The OCSP 
included eligible women aged 20-69, but my analysis was limited to women aged 35-69 
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who were enrolled with a FHG or FHO or active patients of a FFS physician. Patients 
with a regular family physician may be more health conscious and more likely to be 
screened than those without [47-49]. The billing code algorithm used has very high 
sensitivity (99%) at the expense of specificity (61%) [30], which may overestimate the 
proportion screened. While this may have some upward bias in my screening results, it is 
unlikely that my conclusions are affected across primary care delivery model types. 
2.5 Conclusions 
Ontario’s reforms have shifted the primary care landscape from small private practices 
reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis towards interdisciplinary practices with blended 
remuneration schemes. Throughout Canada the proportion of physician income coming 
from alternative payments is increasing compared to FFS payments [49], so it is 
interesting to understand its impact on outcomes. My results contribute to the growing 
body of empirical evidence on the effects of remuneration and incentives on quality.  I 
found significantly higher cervical cancer screening rates among models eligible for 
preventive care bonuses than the FFS model. There was a small but statistically 
significant difference across remuneration with the enhanced FFS model having higher 
rates than the blended capitation model. Average costs per screening were lowest in the 
FFS model and highest in the FHO model as a result of bonus payments. However many 
physicians claim the highest bonus level, which may be due to historically high screening 
rates. Linking bonus payments to change in screening rates may encourage low 
performing physicians to improve their screening rates. 
Future research can expand on the impact of incentives on other preventive care services 
such as breast or colorectal cancer screening or the effect of Ontario’s chronic disease 
management incentive on quality of care. Performance could be assessed in other primary 
care delivery models. Finally, future research could examine how recent changes to the 
target population and coverage period of the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus for Pap 
smears will affect screening rates and costs.   
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2.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: Cumulative preventive care bonuses for cervical cancer screening 
Achieved Screening 
Participation Rate 
Fee Payable 
60% $220 
65% $440 
70% $660 
75% $1,320 
80% $2,200 
 
 
Box 2.1: Fractional logit regression used to estimate screening rates 
Where programi is a dummy variable representing primary care delivery model. In 
regression model 1 programi is equal to 0 for the FFS model and equal to 1 for the FHG. 
In regression model 2 programi is equal to 0 for the FHO and equal to 1 for the FHG. In 
regression model 3 programi is equal to 0 for the FFS model and equal to 1 for the FHO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

E(y i)  g
1(x i), y i ~ Bin
g(.)  log it
y i  PCP practice  level screening rate
x i  0  1programi  2mean _ agei  3rurali  4deprivation i  5instability i 
6ethnic _concentration  7PCP _ gender  8PCP _exp erience i  9screen _ practice _ sizei
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of study physicians 
Model FFS FHG FHO Total 
N (%) 1,172 (16.1%) 2,847 (39.0%) 3,279 (44.9%) 7,298 
Age, Years     
Mean (95% CI)* 53.7 (52.9-54.5) 52.5 (52.1-52.9) 51.0 (50.7-51.4) 52.0 (51.8-52.3) 
Gender, %*     
Female 36.3% 40.9% 42.1% 40.7% 
Medical Training, %* 
IMGs 26.9% 29.3% 11.1% 20.7% 
Experience, Years Since Graduation 
Mean (95% CI)* 27.1 (26.3-27.9) 26.4 (26.0-26.8) 24.6 (24.3-25.0) 25.7 (25.5-26.0) 
Experience Category, %* 
< 10 years 15.8% 7.1% 10.0% 9.8% 
10-19 years 15.3% 21.6% 22.6% 21.0% 
≥ 20 years 68.9% 71.3% 67.4% 69.2% 
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population* 
Mean (95% CI) 185 (172-190) 293 (286-300) 315 (310-320) 286 (282-289) 
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population Category, %* 
≤ 100 women 35.4% 14.2% 4.5% 13.3% 
> 100 women 64.6% 85.8% 95.5% 86.7% 
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; CI = confidence 
interval 
* p < 0.001 
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of study patients 
Model FFS FHG FHO Total 
N (%) 216,609 (10.4%) 833,706 (40.0%) 1,033,318 (49.6%) 2,083,633 
Age, Years     
Mean (95% CI)* 49.38 (49.35-
49.42) 
49.58 (49.56-49.6) 50.38 (50.36-
50.40) 
49.96 (49.94-
49.97) 
Age Category, %* 
35-39 years 21.0% 20.0% 17.7% 19.0% 
40-49 years 31.8% 32.2% 30.7% 31.4% 
50-59 years 31.7% 32.0% 33.8% 32.9% 
60-69 years 15.4% 15.7% 17.7% 16.7% 
Rural, %*     
Rural 6.1% 2.2% 7.5% 5.2% 
Ontario Marginalization Index Quintiles, % 
Material Deprivation*† 
Q1  23.5% 28.9% 29.4% 28.5% 
Q2 20.9% 23.7% 24.2% 23.6% 
Q3 20.1% 19.5% 19.6% 19.6% 
Q4 17.8% 14.8% 15.0% 15.2% 
Q5  16.4% 12.4% 11.0% 12.1% 
Missing 1.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 
Dependency*†     
Q1 26.6% 28.7% 20.8% 24.5% 
Q2 23.8% 26.2% 22.6% 24.1% 
Q3 18.9% 18.4% 20.7% 19.6% 
Q4 15.0% 13.6% 17.8% 15.8% 
Q5 14.4% 12.4% 17.3% 15.0% 
Missing 1.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 
Ethnic Concentration*† 
Q1 8.4% 6.5% 14.2% 10.5% 
Q2 11.0% 10.4% 19.7% 15.1% 
Q3 13.9% 13.9% 20.7% 17.3% 
Q4 19.6% 20.7% 22.0% 21.2% 
Q5 45.8% 47.8% 22.6% 35.1% 
Missing 1.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 
Residential Instability*† 
Q1 26.2% 32.8% 27.3% 29.4% 
Q2 19.0% 20.9% 22.7% 21.6% 
Q3 14.5% 13.6% 17.2% 15.5% 
Q4 18.5% 16.1% 17.2% 16.9% 
Q5 20.5% 15.8% 14.7% 15.8% 
Missing 1.4% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; CI = confidence 
interval 
* p < 0.001, † Q1 is the least marginalized & Q5 is the most marginalized 
 
 
 
55 
 
Table 2.4: Regression model predictions of mean physician practice screening rate 
Model Mean Predicted Screening Rate (95% CI) Difference p-value 
Model 1: FFS versus FHG 
 FFS FHG   
 74.16% (73.95-74.37) 81.86% (81.69-82.02) 7.70 (7.65-7.74) < 0.0001 
Model 2: FHG versus FHO 
 FHO FHG   
 79.6% (79.43-79.77) 81.88% (81.73-82.04) 2.28 (2.27-2.30) < 0.0001 
Model 3: FFS versus FHO 
 FFS FHO   
 72.51% (72.29-72.73) 78.75% (78.56-78.93) 6.24 (6.21-6.28) < 0.0001 
CI = confidence interval; FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family 
Health Organization 
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Figure 2.1: (a) Mean unadjusted physician practice rate by primary care delivery 
model; (b): predicted physician practice screening rates from regression model 1; 
(c): predicted physician practice screening rates from regression model 2; (d) 
predicted physicians practice screening rates from regression model 3  
Estimates of mean screening rates in Figure 2.1 (b)-(d) were predicted using the method 
of recycled predictions [32]. 
 
 
 
a 
b a 
c d 
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Table 2.5: Cumulative preventive care bonuses for Pap smear delivery claimed by 
FHG and FHO physicians in 2010/2011 
 FHG FHO Total 
N 2,847 3,279 6,126 
Physician Bonus Claims, N (%) 
No claim 1,257 (44.2%) 622 (19.0%) 1,879 (30.7%) 
Bonus claimed 1,590 (55.8%) 2,657 (81.0%) 4,247 (69.3%) 
Performance Level Claimed, N (%)  
$220 (60%) 128 (8.1%) 
$28,160 
190 (7.2%) 
$41,800 
318 (7.5%) 
$69,960 
$440 (65%) 126 (7.9%) 
$55,440 
179 (6.7%) 
$78,760 
305 (7.2%) 
$134,200 
$660 (70% 120 (7.5%) 
$79,200 
216 (8.1%) 
$142,560 
336 (7.9%) 
$221,760 
$1,320 (75%) 202 (12.7%) 
$266,640 
326 (12.3%) 
$430,320 
528 (12.4%) 
$693,000 
$2,200 (80%) 1,014 (63.8%) 
$2,230,800 
1,746 (65.7%) 
$3,841,200 
2,760 (65.0%) 
$6,072,000 
Total Payments $2,660,240 $4,534,640 $7,194,880 
FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization 
 
Table 2.6: Average costs of delivering cervical cancer screening by primary care 
model including bonus payments where eligible 
Costs of Cervical Cancer Screening 
 FFS FHG FHO Total 
1-year Paps, N 52,774 233,134 271,241 557,149 
Pap Delivery 
Costs* 
$965,764 $4,266,352 $4,963,710 $10,195.827 
Bonus Payments  - $2,660,240 $4,534,640 $7,194,880 
Total 1-year Costs $965,764 $6,926,592 $9,498,350 $17,390,708 
Average cost per 
screening 
$18.30 $29.71 $35.02 $31.21 
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; 
ICER = incremental cost-effectiveness ratio 
* Annual costs of delivering Pap smears where a Pap smear is valued at $18.30. 
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Figure 2.2: Predicted screening rates and cost per woman screened  
Estimates of mean screening rates in Figure 2.2 were predicted using the method of 
recycled predictions [32]. 
  
FFS 
FHG 
FHO 
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2.8 Appendices 
2.8.1 Appendix A2.1 
The Family Health Group (FHG) is an enhanced fee-for-service (FFS) based model, 
where physicians may receive additional incentives and premiums. The Family Health 
Organization (FHO) is a capitation model, where physicians receive age- and sex-
adjusted capitation payments and may also receive incentives for enrolled patients. 
Common features of both models include: a group practice model, formal patient 
enrolment or rostering, after-hours care requirements and performance-based financial 
incentives. Organizational and funding characteristics of selected primary care delivery 
models are summarized in Table 2.7. One of the key incentives offered exclusively to 
physicians practicing in reformed models is the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus. This 
pay-for-performance (P4P) program rewards physicians with stepped payments for 
delivering target levels of service coverage among their enrolled patients for five 
preventive care services (Pap smears, mammograms, colorectal cancer screening, toddler 
immunizations and senior flu shots). With respect to Pap smears, physicians could 
receive up to $2,200 depending on the rate of service coverage among enrolled women 
aged 35-69 in the prior 30 months (Table 1). 
6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 In fiscal year 2013/2014 the Pap smear target population was expanded to enrolled women aged 21-69 
years and the coverage period was extended to 36 months. 
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Table 2.7: Characteristics of selected primary care delivery models in Ontario 
Model Fee-for-service 
(FFS) 
Family Health 
Group (FHG) 
Family Health 
Organization 
(FHO) Characteristic 
Year of 
introduction 
1966 2003 2006 
Physician 
remuneration 
FFS Enhanced FFS Blended capitation 
Targeted 
incentives 
No Yes Yes 
Group 
organization 
Usually solo 
physician-led 
Minimum 3 
physicians; 
physician-led 
Minimum 3 
physicians; 
physician-led 
Formal patient 
enrolment 
N/A Patients assigned to 
virtual roster based 
on visit history, but 
formal enrolment is 
encouraged 
Active enrolment 
required 
Core services N/A 33 fee codes (e.g. 
office visits) 
132 fee codes (e.g. 
office visits, Pap 
smears) 
FFS payments 100% schedule of 
benefits (SOB) rate 
100% SOB rate + 
10% premium for 
core services 
delivered to enrolled 
patients 
Shadow billings at 
15% SOB rate for 
core services & 
100% SOB rate for 
non-core services 
delivered to enrolled 
patients and all 
services to non-
enrolled patients 
Capitation 
payments 
N/A Comprehensive care 
management fee for 
enrolled patients 
Age- and sex-
adjusted base rate + 
access bonus & 
comprehensive care 
management fee for 
enrolled patients  
Cumulative 
preventive care 
bonuses 
N/A Eligible if minimum 
roster size of 650 
patients met 
Eligible; no roster 
size requirements 
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2.8.2 Appendix A2.2 
Table 2.8: Ontario Marginalization Index dimension census indicators 
Material 
Deprivation 
Dependency Residential 
Instability 
Ethnic 
Concentration 
Indicators 
Proportion of 
population ≥ 15 
years that are 
unemployed 
Proportion of 
population ≥ 15 
years that are 
unemployed* 
Proportion of 
population living 
alone 
Proportion of 
population that are 
recent immigrants (≤ 
5 years) 
Proportion of 
population ≥ 20 
years without high-
school diploma 
Proportion of 
population ≥ 65 
years 
Average persons 
per dwelling* 
Proportion of 
population 
identifying as visible 
minorities 
Proportion of 
population receiving 
government transfer 
payments 
Dependency ratio: 
population 0-14 and 
≥ 65 years / 
population 15-64 
years 
Proportion of 
dwellings that are 
rented* 
 
Proportion of 
population 
considered low 
income 
 Proportion of 
dwellings that are 
apartment buildings 
 
Proportion of 
families that are 
single parent 
families 
 Proportion of 
population that 
moved within past 5 
years 
 
Proportion of 
dwellings in need of 
major repair  
 Proportion of 
population that are 
single, divorced or 
widowed* 
 
  Proportion of 
population ≥ 16 
years* 
 
* Census indicators that were reverse coded for the index (i.e. proportion of population < 
16 years in census was used to find the proportion ≥ 16 years) 
Adapted Matheson et al. 2012 [23] 
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2.8.3 Appendix A2.3 
Table 2.9: Bivariate analyses of physician factors associated with patient-level 
screen status 
Screen status Screened Not screened 
N (%) 1,671,443 (80.2%) 412,344 (19.8%) 
Program Model, %*   
FFS 73.1% 26.9% 
FHG 83.9% 16.1% 
FHO 78.8% 21.2% 
Mean Age (95% CI)* 52.60 (52.59-52.62) 53.65 (53.62-53.68) 
Gender, %*   
Female 86.4% 13.6% 
Male 75.6% 24.4% 
Medical Training, %*   
Trained in Canada 79.8% 20.2% 
Foreign Training 81.7% 18.3% 
Missing 44.8% 55.2% 
Experience, Years Since Graduation 
Mean (95% CI)* 26.47 (26.45-26.48) 27.42 (27.38-27.45) 
Experience Category, %*   
< 10 years 80.6% 19.4% 
10-19 years 81.6% 18.4% 
≥ 20 years 79.8% 20.2% 
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population 
Mean (95% CI)* 390.09 (389.74-390.44) 381.12 (380.56-381.68) 
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population Category, %* 
≤ 100 women 76.6% 23.4% 
> 100 women 80.3% 19.7% 
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; 
PCP = primary care physician 
* p < 0.001 
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Table 2.10: Bivariate analyses of patient factors associated with patient-level screen 
status 
Screen status Screened Not screened 
Mean Age (95% CI)* 49.60 (45.59-49.62) 51.38 (51.35-51.44) 
Age Category, %*   
35-39 84.0% 16.0% 
40-49 81.7% 18.3% 
50-59 79.2% 20.8% 
60-69 75.0% 25.0% 
Rural, %*   
Rural 72.2% 27.8% 
Urban 80.7% 19.3% 
Ontario Marginalization Index Quintiles, % 
Material Deprivation*†   
Q1 (least marginalized) 84.1% 15.9% 
Q2 81.6% 18.4% 
Q3 79.1% 20.9% 
Q4 76.9% 23.1% 
Q5 (most marginalized) 74.7% 25.3% 
Missing 74.1% 25.9% 
Dependency*†   
Q1 (least marginalized) 82.3% 17.7% 
Q2 81.5% 18.5% 
Q3 79.7% 20.3% 
Q4 78.4% 21.6% 
Q5 (most marginalized) 77.7% 22.3% 
Missing 74.1% 25.9% 
Ethnic Concentration*†   
Q1 (least marginalized) 75.7% 24.3% 
Q2 77.5% 22.5% 
Q3 79.2% 20.8% 
Q4 81.5% 18.5% 
Q5 (most marginalized) 82.6% 17.4% 
Missing 74.1% 25.9% 
Residential Instability*†   
Q1 (least marginalized) 83.1% 16.9% 
Q2 81.0% 19.0% 
Q3 79.0% 21.0% 
Q4 78.1% 21.9% 
Q5 (most marginalized) 77.6% 22.4% 
Missing 74.1% 25.9% 
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; 
PCP = primary care physician 
* p < 0.001 
† Q1 is the least marginalized & Q5 is the most marginalized 
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Figure 2.3: Mean unadjusted physician practice screening rate by age group and 
primary care model 
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2.8.4 Appendix A2.4 
Table 2.11: Parameters from fractional logit models predicting screening rates 
Regression Model 1: FFS-FHG 2: FHO-FHG 3: FFS-FHO 
  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
Characteristic 
Intercept 0.046 (0.423) 1.698 (0.461)** -0.229 (0.453) 
Program Model† 0.463 (0.031)*** 0.151 (0.023)*** 0.349 (0.034)*** 
Mean Patient Age 0.009 (0.009) -0.020 (0.009)^^ 0.016 (0.009)^ 
% Rural -0.021 (0.117) -0.44 (0.092) 0.250 (0.066)** 
% Deprivation Q1&2 0.651 (0.094)*** 0.749 (0.097)*** 0.798 (0.106)*** 
% Ethnic Con. Q1&2 -0.682 (0.102)*** -0.756 (0.075)*** -0.832 (0.073)*** 
% Instability Q1&2 0.113 (0.103) 0.142 (0.070)^^ -0.067 (0.010) 
Female PCP 0.496 (0.029)*** 0.543 (0.023)*** 0.551 (0.025)*** 
< 10 Years Experience -0.083 (0.032)^^ 0.010 (0.026) 0.004 (0.028) 
10-19 Years 
Experience 
-0.109 (0.046)^^ 0.043 (0.041) -0.09 (0.037)^^ 
≤ 100 patients in Pap 
smear target population 
0.221 (0.039)*** 0.346 (0.052)*** 0.093 (0.045)^ 
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; 
SE = standard error; Q = quintile; PCP = primary care physician 
† Program = FHG in Models 1&2 and program - FHO in Model 3 
^ p < 0.1, ^^ p < 0.05, * p < 0.01, ** p < 0.001, *** p < 0.0001  
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2.8.5 Appendix A2.5 
Table 2.12: Bivariate analyses of factors associated with claiming a Cumulative 
Preventive Care Bonus for Pap smear coverage 
Characteristic Bonus Claimed No Bonus Claimed 
N (%) 4,247 (69.3%) 1,879 (30.7%) 
Program Model, %*   
FHG 55.8% 44.2% 
FHO 81.0% 19.0% 
Mean Age (95% CI)* 50.71 (50.41-51.01) 54.01 (53.48-54.54) 
Gender, %*   
Female 79.7% 20.3% 
Male 62.0% 38.0% 
Medical Training, %*   
Trained in Canada 72.6% 27.4% 
Foreign Trained 55.9% 44.1% 
Experience, Years Since Graduation 
Mean (95% CI)* 24.47 (24.16-24.78) 27.73 (27.18-28.27) 
Experience Category, %*   
< 10 years 71.6% 28.4% 
10-19 years 74.0% 26.0% 
≥ 20 years 67.5% 32.5% 
Number of Patients in Pap Smear Target Population Category, %* 
≤ 100 women 22.4% 77.6% 
> 100 women 74.0% 26.0% 
FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization; CI = confidence 
interval 
* p < 0.001 
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Chapter 3  
3 Costs of Cervical Cancer Treatment: Estimates from 
Ontario, Canada 
3.1 Introduction 
The leading cause of death in Canada is cancer, which accounts for nearly 30% of all 
deaths [1]. Cancer is one of the most costly diseases [2], so it is no wonder that the 
economic burden of cancer is substantial in Canada. The direct cost of cancer care in 
Canada in 2008 was estimated at $4 billion [3]. Cervical cancer is the second leading 
cause of cancer death among Ontario women aged 20 to 44 years [4], and the fourth most 
common cause of cancer death among women worldwide [5]. During their lifetime, one 
in 145 Ontario women will be diagnosed with cervical cancer, and each year in Ontario 
610 women are diagnosed with cervical cancer and 150 will die from cervical cancer [1]. 
Treatment for cervical cancer is complex, which may include surgery, chemotherapy and 
radiation therapy. Among Ontario women diagnosed with cervical cancer in 2003/04, 
over 30% of patients received chemotherapy and an estimated 55% received radiation 
therapy [6]. More than half of Ontario cervical cancer patients had a cancer-related 
surgical procedure, and each case had an average 1.5 hospital admissions within 12 
months of diagnosis [6]. Resource consumption is highest during the initial phase of 
treatment and the terminal phase before death [7]. Resource consumption in the first year 
after diagnosis is very high as this is the period when cervical cancer patients undergo 
primary treatment and experience the greatest mortality [8,9].  
Estimates of the costs of cancer care are necessary inputs for economic evaluations, 
policy decisions and forecasting future medical care expenditures relating to cancer 
treatment. However there are few studies estimating the costs of cervical cancer treatment 
in Canada. To the best of my knowledge, no Canadian study has examined cervical 
cancer costs beyond the first year after diagnosis or accounted for variable lengths of 
follow-up. Moreover, previous publications on cost estimates using Ontario 
administrative data did not include costs associated with visits to cancer clinics or 
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dialysis clinics or mental health admissions as these data were not available before 2007. 
The objective of this study is to fill this gap by providing estimates of the total direct 
medical care costs of treating cervical cancer in the first three years post-diagnosis from 
the perspective of the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care (MOHLTC). I 
accounted for censoring while estimating the cost of cervical cancer.  
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Patient Cohort 
Ontario women aged 35 to 69 years with incident primary cases of cervical cancer 
(International Classification of Disease, ninth revision, ICD-9 180.x) diagnosed between 
January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2010 were identified from the Ontario Cancer 
Registry (OCR). The study index date for each patient was her date of diagnosis. Baseline 
characteristics included age at diagnosis, rural residence, number of Johns Hopkins 
Aggregated Diagnosis Groups (ADGs) and expected resource utilization band (RUB). 
Note that cost data are unavailable for cancer clinic visits, dialysis clinic visits and mental 
health hospital admissions before 2007. Since exclusion of these costs may underestimate 
the total medical care costs, I did not performe cost analyses for patients diagnosed prior 
to January 2007. 
3.2.2 Data Sources 
Data were obtained from the Institute for Clinical Evaluative Sciences (ICES), which 
holds population-based health administrative databases needed for this study. The OCR is 
a population-based registry containing all incident cases of cancer and cancer deaths in 
Ontario. Cervical cancer cases were identified from the OCR and were linked to other 
administrative health databases using unique, encoded identifiers and analysed at ICES. 
The Registered Persons Database (RPDB) contains demographic information on all 
individuals covered by the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP). The OHIP claims 
database contains all fee-for-service billing claims made by Ontario primary care 
physicians, specialists and other health care providers in private practice, hospital or other 
health facilities. The Client Agency Program Enrolment (CAPE) tables contain patient 
rosters of primary care physicians who receive age- and sex-adjusted capitation payments 
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for each enrolled patient. Shadow billings claimed by primary care physicians and other 
providers in alternative payment plans are captured by the OHIP claims database. The 
Canadian Institute for Health Information Discharge Abstract Database (CIHI-DAD) 
contains administrative and clinical data on all inpatient hospitalizations. The National 
Ambulatory Care Reporting System (NACRS) holds records of all ambulatory visits to 
Ontario hospitals. NACRS captures data on emergency department (ED) visits, same day 
surgery (SDS) procedures and visits to ambulatory clinics, such as regional cancer 
centres and dialysis clinics. The National Rehabilitation Reporting System (NRS) 
database holds data on all admissions to rehabilitation beds in hospital. The Continuing 
Care Reporting System (CCRS) provides information on individuals receiving long-term 
care in complex continuing care beds. The Ontario Mental Health Reporting System 
(OMHRS) captures administrative and clinical data on all adult mental health admissions. 
The Home Care Database (HCD) contains demographic and service information for 
individuals receiving in-home services. The Ontario Drug Benefit (ODB) Program 
provides prescription drug coverage to individuals aged 65 and older, residents of long-
term care facilities and other groups. ODB database contains prescription drug costs for 
those aged 65 and older. The Office of the Registrar General collects vital statistics on 
Ontario residents including date and cause of death. 
3.2.3 Cost Estimates 
Estimates of total direct medical care costs were computed using the %getcost SAS 
macro developed for ICES data holdings [11]. The macro uses entries in a number of 
administrative databases to calculate total medical care costs for a defined time period. 
Costs captured include those from cancer clinic visits, hospital-based care, tertiary care, 
physician services, outpatient prescription drugs (ODB recipients) and other sources of 
care (Table 3.1). Cancer clinic costs captures all costs associated with chemotherapy, 
radiation therapy and other cancer-related services.  
The ICES cost macro use both top-down and bottom-up costing methodology depending 
on the type of cost [11]. When unit prices are unavailable, the top-down method is used 
to assign costs using the average cost of a given metric (e.g. per diem cost or relative 
value weights). The following costs were calculated using the top-down approach: 
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inpatient hospitalizations, same-day-surgery procedures, ED visits, dialysis clinic visits, 
cancer clinic visits, rehabilitation admissions, mental health admissions, complex 
continuing care and long-term care. The unit cost for inpatient hospitalizations, SDSs, ED 
visits, rehabilitation and ambulatory clinic visits is the Cost Per Weighted Case (CPWC) 
[12]. All patients are assigned a Resource Intensity Weight (RIW) based on Case Mix 
Group, which estimates expected resource utilization relative to the average patient (RIW 
= 1). Total spending is divided by the sum of all RIWs to obtain CPWC. The cost of a 
specific case is the product of assigned RIW and CPWC (Box 3.1). Longer episodes of 
care, such as mental health or complex continuing care admissions, have a unit cost of 
Cost Per Weighted Day (CPWD). For each patient stay, Case Mix is periodically 
assessed to assign a relative weight for each day of care, which estimates an overall 
weighted length of stay (LOS). Case cost is the product of CPWD and weighted LOS. 
Bottom-up costing methods assign unit costs associated with a particular procedure, 
service or drug. The following costs were calculated using the bottom-up approach: home 
care services, outpatient physician visits and procedures, prescription drugs, outpatient 
laboratory tests and other outpatient services covered by OHIP. Records of healthcare 
utilization in the HCD, ODB and OHIP databases are multiplied by the associated unit 
cost set by the Ontario Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care to estimate overall 
resource consumption. Capitation payments for patients in the CAPE tables are calculated 
by age and sex. 
Costs were computed from the date of diagnosis until December 31st of that year or death 
if earlier. Subsequently annual costs were computed until the earliest of the following 
events: 1) death or 2) December 31st, 2010. Costs for each year were adjusted for 
inflation to 2010 Canadian dollars using the Statistics Canada’s Consumer Price Index for 
healthcare. 
3.2.4 Analysis 
Descriptive results are reported for baseline characteristics of the study cohort. Mean 
costs and mean cumulative costs were calculated each year following diagnosis for this 
cohort. Costs were broken down by resource category to identify the largest drivers of 
cost in each year of treatment. Complete cost data are available for cases where death is 
71 
 
observed. However, differential follow-up due to varying index dates means that some 
cases are censored (i.e. those who do not die during the study period and have incomplete 
cost data). Thus, I estimated costs using three methods: a) naïve estimator, b) simple 
weighted estimator proposed by Bang and Tsiatis (B&T) in 2000 and c) an improved 
estimator adapted by Pfeifer and Bang (2005) from B&T’s estimators. 
Equation 3.1: The naïve estimator for estimating costs of a cohort of patients 
mˆ =
1
n
M i
i=1
n
å .
                 (1) 
In equation (1), mˆ  is the estimated arithmetic mean costs, Mi is cost accumulated by 
patient i during a given time period. The estimates based on equation (1) will bias the 
mean downward as costs accrued after observed follow-up are equated to zero [13,14]. 
Estimates from only complete observations will be biased upward to patients with shorter 
survival time [14]. Applying standard survival analysis techniques to costing analyses is 
also invalid as censoring and cost are not independent [12,15,16]. Patients that slowly 
accumulate costs are more likely to be censored than high cost users; therefore the mean 
is biased upward [15,16]. Given that censoring increases with follow-up, appropriate 
statistical methods that address censoring are required to reduce bias in estimates of costs. 
Simple Weighted Estimator: One way to improve the naïve estimator is to estimate 
mean time-restricted cost in the presence of censoring using inverse probability 
weighting. Complete cases are those that die or are observed until the end of the study 
interval. Costs are weighted by the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the inverse probability of 
not being censored at the end of the interval. In 2000, B&T proposed a simple weighted 
estimator, which averages the weighted overall costs of complete cases for the entire 
study period. 
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Equation 3.2: The simple weighted estimator for estimating costs of a cohort of 
patients 
mˆWT =
1
n
DiM i
Kˆ(Ti )i=1
n
å .
                (2) 
In equation (2), mˆWT  is estimated mean costs based on the simple weighted estimator, Ti 
indicates a failure time and Ci indicates a censored time.  Observed follow-up time, Xi = 
min(Ti, Ci), ∆i = I(Ti≤C). I(.) is the indicator function where I=1 indicates a failure and 
I=0 indicates a censored observation. T is bounded by the maximum follow-up time L, 
where Ti≤L and Pr(Ci≥L)>0. K(Ti) is the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the probability of not 
being censored at failure time Ti or censoring time Ci. Estimates based on equation (2) 
allows for continuous death and censoring times, and provides a consistent estimate of 
mean cumulative medical care cost [13,17,18]. However, this estimator is inefficient as it 
relies on costs from patients with complete data and may be unstable with heavy 
censoring [13,17].  
Improved Weighted Estimator: The improved partitioned B&T estimator attempts to 
improve upon the simple weighted estimator by using data from censored cases if 
detailed cost history is available [17]. The study period is partitioned into smaller 
intervals where complete cases die during or are observed until the end of a given interval 
[17]. The simple weighted method is used to estimate accumulated cost in each interval 
and the weighted costs across all intervals are summed [17]. The partitioned estimator is 
usually, but not necessarily, more efficient than the simple weighted estimator [17].  
Zhao and Tian adapted the improved B&T method to propose an estimator that is more 
efficient and convenient, but does not require detailed cost history or partition the study 
period [13,19]. This analysis used the improved estimator proposed by Pfeifer and Bang, 
which is a simpler, user-friendly formula adapted from Zhao and Tian [20]. 
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Equation 3.3: The improved weighted estimator for estimating costs of a cohort of 
patients
 
mˆIMP =
1
n
DiM i
Kˆ(Ti )i=1
n
å +
1
n
(1-Di ){M i -M (Ci )}
Kˆ(Ci )i=1
n
å ; M (Ci )=
I(X j ³Ci )M j (C j )
j=1
n
å
I(X j ³Ci )
j=1
n
å
.
        (3) 
In equation (3), mˆIMP  is the estimated mean costs based on the improved estimator, M(Ci) 
is the mean cost of all individuals still under observation at censoring time Ci, Xj indicates 
that individual j is still under observation beyond individual i’s censoring time, and 
Mj(Cj) is the cost accumulated by individual j at time Ci.  
The improved estimator has two parts: 1) mean cost of complete cases estimated by the 
simple weighted B&T method; 2) an efficiency term that estimates the costs of censored 
cases [18]. Censored costs are adjusted by subtracting the mean cost of all other cases 
still under observation at that censoring time. Adjusted censored costs are then weighted 
by the Kaplan-Meier inverse probability of not being censored at that time. The 
efficiency term is the average of weighted censored costs.  
Overall and specific costs during the first year after diagnosis were estimated without 
taking censoring into account for the cohort and by one-year vital status. Cumulative 
overall and cancer clinic costs were estimated using naïve, simple weighted and 
improved weighted estimators for years one through three following cervical cancer 
diagnosis. Annual overall and cancer clinic costs were also estimated using naïve, simple 
weighted and improved weighted estimators for the first three years post-diagnosis. All 
analyses were conducted using SAS and Zhao and Wang’s SAS code was used for 
censored cost estimators [14].  
3.3 Results 
The study cohort included 784 cases of cervical cancer diagnosed between 2007 and 
2010. Mean age at diagnosis was 49 years, and baseline characteristics are summarized in 
Table 3.2. About 32% (254) of patients died within three years of diagnosis and 71% 
74 
 
(181) of deaths were caused by cervical cancer. Vital status and cause of death 
information were available to a later date than cost data were for the whole cohort. 
Therefore there are some patients who died within a year of their diagnoses, but their cost 
data are censored before their death. In the first year after diagnosis about 27% of the 
cohort had censored cost data. Administrative censoring increased steadily and by the end 
of year three almost 65% of patients had censored cost data (Table 3.3).  Throughout the 
study period, there were 78 cases that died within three years of diagnosis whose cost 
data were not observed at their time of death. 
Table 3.4 reports the mean costs for the study cohort and by one-year vital status without 
taking censoring into account. Overall mean costs during the first year post-diagnosis 
were $35,700 (standard error [SE]: $1,239). Mean costs were much higher among those 
who died within one year from diagnosis ($63,016; SE: $4,246) compared to those 
surviving longer than one year ($31,195; SE: $1,177). The highest cost category was 
cancer clinic costs (41%) for those who survived one year or longer (Table 3.4; Figure 
3.1) and inpatient hospitalization (54%) for patients who died within a year (Table 3.4; 
Figure 3.2). Mean overall and cancer clinic costs by one-year vital status estimated using 
the simple weighted and improved methods are summarized in Appendix 3.1 Table 3.6.  
Mean cumulative costs estimated using naïve, simple weighted and improved methods 
are reported in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3. Annual costs were highest during year one 
($40,231; SE: $1,356) and decreased during subsequent two years ($14,459; SE: $1,787) 
and three ($9,383; SE: $1,678). Estimates of mean cost that did not account for censoring 
were consistently lower than the B&T estimators. Mean cumulative one- and three-year 
costs were $35,700 (SE: $1,239) and $45,317 ($1,942), respectively, when using naïve 
methods. Using the improved estimator, cumulative one- and three-year costs were 
$40,231 ($1,356) and $59,314 ($2,898), respectively. Estimates using simple weighted 
and improved methods were similar, but the variance of the improved estimator was 
smaller and thus more efficient. Cancer clinic costs were $14,124 (SE: $370) in year one 
and $16,434 (SE: $545) during years one through three (Appendix 3.1 Table 3.7). 
Specific costs estimated using simple weighted methods are presented in Appendix 3.1 
Table 3.7. 
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3.4 Discussion 
This study estimated direct medical care costs of cervical cancer patients in Ontario 
during the first three years following diagnosis of cervical cancer. Cumulative three-year 
cancer clinic and overall costs were $16,434 and $59,314 per case, respectively. Cost 
accumulation was greatest during the first year after diagnosis. This seems reasonable 
since treatment is most aggressive during this period [7,8,10]. Annual total medical care 
costs decreased from $40,231 per case in the first year post-diagnosis to $14,459 during 
year two and $9,383 during year three. Patients who died within one year from diagnosis 
had much higher one-year costs ($66,250) than patients who survived at least one year 
($35,759).  
I found that cancer clinic and hospital admissions were the two largest drivers of costs in 
the first year after diagnosis. These cost categories capture costs associated with cancer-
related treatments such as chemotherapy, radiation therapy and cancer-related surgeries. 
A previous study of cancer costs in Ontario also found that inpatient hospitalizations and 
cancer-related care were the two greatest sources of cost [10]. My estimate of inpatient 
admissions ($6,914) was similar to those of de Oliveira et al ($6,761). However, my 
estimate of cancer-related care ($12,941) was much higher than their estimates of 
chemotherapy ($804) and radiation therapy ($3,468) combined. This difference is likely 
due to my estimates including all cancer clinic visits, which are not limited to 
chemotherapy and radiation therapy, and include additional services such as palliative 
care, surgical oncology and supportive services. Furthermore, de Oliveira et al may have 
underestimated the costs of radiation therapy as the cost per fraction of radiation was 
estimated using data from the 1990s.   
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first Canadian study of medical care costs 
associated with cervical cancer patients that takes censoring into account. A previous 
Ontario study reported mean one-year costs of $18,055 (2009 Canadian dollars) for 
cervical cancer patients who survived one year and $41,536 for cases who died within 
one year [10]. My naïve estimates are much higher, which is due to different estimation 
methods of cancer-related costs and inclusion of costs associated with rehabilitation, 
mental health admissions, dialysis clinic visits, and all OHIP billings. As far as I know, 
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there are no Canadian studies of cervical costs beyond year one to compare with my 
results. Resource consumption was highest during year one, accounting for 67% of 
cumulative three-year costs. This result is similar to Insinga et al’s finding that 69% of 
three-year costs were incurred during year one [9]. Similar to other studies of cervical 
and other cancer patients, I found that patients who died had much higher mean costs 
than those surviving [8,10]. End-of-life care is a significant source of cancer costs; the 
cost of care for Ontario genitourinary/gynaecologic cancer patients during the six months 
before death was estimated at $23,770 [21].  
My study has several strengths. First, I reported overall and specific medical care costs of 
cervical cancer treatment for the first year and beyond the first year after diagnosis. My 
cost estimates may be useful for economic evaluations of interventions to prevent 
cervical cancer and calculation of life-time cervical cancer related costs. Second, I 
accounted for censoring to reduce bias in my cost estimates. My naïve cost estimates 
were much lower than those estimated using the simple weighted and improved methods. 
Thus, previous cost estimates of cervical cancer care reporting naïve estimates are likely 
underestimated, so my estimates are more likely to represent the true cost of treatment. 
Third, I included all medical care costs covered by the Ontario Ministry of Health and 
Long-Term Care. Estimates of overall resource utilization may be of use for decision-
makers to identify and implement preventive intervention strategies. Finally, my cost 
estimates are more reliable for conducting cost-effectiveness analyses.   
This study has several limitations. First, costs are highly skewed and estimates of mean 
cost are influenced by high-users. Second, cancer staging data were not available for the 
study cohort. Cancer stage is associated with survival, which affects resource utilization. 
Third, I assessed overall medical care costs of cervical cancer patients instead of net costs 
of cervical cancer patients. Fourth, the ODB provides prescription drug coverage for 
women aged 65 years and older, so I was unable to capture the costs of drugs associated 
with treatment for younger patients. However chemotherapy, the largest 
pharmacotherapy cost, is administered in hospital and captured by my estimates of cancer 
clinic costs. A limitation of using administrative databases and the ICES cost macro is 
that I was unable to separate healthcare utilization unrelated to a patient’s cancer 
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diagnosis. However I expect costs unrelated to cancer is likely to be small for this patient 
population. Finally, data limitations precluded me from estimating the costs of treatment 
beyond three years following diagnosis. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This study analyzed the overall and specific medical care costs of treating cervical cancer 
in the first three years following diagnosis of cervical cancer in Ontario. By taking 
censoring into account, my estimates are more likely to reflect the true cost of cervical 
cancer treatment in Ontario. Overall medical care costs were approximately $40,000 in 
year one, $14,000 in year two and $9,000 in year three. Costs associated with cancer 
clinic visits and inpatient admissions were the two largest sources of cervical cancer 
treatment costs. However, physician services and home care were also significant drivers 
of costs. My estimates may be of use for future economic evaluations of human 
papillomavirus vaccines, screening strategies or interventions to improve screening. 
Decision-makers may also find my estimates useful for policy planning or projecting 
future costs. 
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3.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1: Source database and costing methodology used to estimate costs 
Resource Source Database Costing Methodology 
Cancer clinic visits FY2006-: NACRS CPWC; top-down 
Hospital-based care   
Inpatient hospitalizations CIHI-DAD Top-down: CPWC 
Same day surgery procedures NACRS Top-down: CPWC 
Emergency department visits NACRS Top-down: CPWC 
Dialysis clinic visits FY2006-: NACRS Top-down: CPWC 
Tertiary care   
Rehabilitation admissions NRS Top-down: CPWC 
Mental health admissions FY2006-: OMHRS Top-down: CPWD 
Complex continuing care CCRS Top-down: CPWD 
Long-term care FY2005-FY2008: 
OHIP & ODB 
FY2009-: CCRS 
Top-down: CPWD  
Home care services HCD Bottom-up: billing based 
Physician services   
FFS physician billings OHIP Bottom-up: billing based 
Physician shadow billings OHIP Bottom-up: billing based 
Primary care capitation 
payments 
CAPE Age- & sex-adjusted 
payment 
Prescription drugs ODB Bottom-up: billing based 
Other   
Non-physician OHIP billings OHIP Bottom-up: billing based 
Laboratory billings OHIP Bottom-up: billing based 
NACRS = National Ambulatory Care Reporting System; CIHI-DAD = Canadian Institute 
for Health Information Discharge Abstract Database; NRS = National Rehabilitation 
Reporting System; OMHRS = Ontario Mental Health Reporting System; CCRS = 
Continuing Care Reporting System; HCD = Home Care Database; OHIP = Ontario 
Health Insurance Plan; ODB = Ontario Drug Benefit; CAPE = Client Agency Program 
Enrolment; CPWC = Cost Per Weighted Case; CPWD = Cost Per Weighted Day 
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Table 3.2: Baseline demographic characteristics of cervical cancer patients 
Characteristic  
N 784 
Diagnosis (ICD-9), N (%)  
Endocervix (1800) 139 (17.7%) 
Exocervix (1801) 21 (2.7%) 
Other specified sites (1808) 23 (2.9%) 
Site unspecified (1809) 601 (76.7%) 
Age at diagnosis, years  
Mean (95% CI) 49.3 (48.7-50.0) 
Median (IQR) 48 (42-56) 
Age category, N (%)  
35-39 120 (15.3%) 
40-49 317 (40.4%) 
50-59 223 (28.4%) 
60-69 124 (15.8%) 
Rural resident, N (%)  
No 729 (93.7%) 
Yes 49 (6.3%) 
Missing 6 
Number of ADGs, N (%)  
0 26 (3.3%) 
1-3 265 (33.8%) 
4-6 389 (49.6%) 
7-10 75 (9.6%) 
≥ 11 29 (3.7%) 
ICD-9 = International Classification of Disease, 9
th
 edition; CI = confidence interval; IQR 
= interquartile range; ADGs = Aggregated Diagnostic Groups 
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Top-down methods 
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(2)           
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Bottom-up methods 
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Box 3.1:  Estimating medical costs using top-down and bottom-up costing methods 
Where Case Costi
j
 is the cost of patient i hospital j. RIWi(y) is the resource intensity 
weight of patient i during episode of care y, and CPWC
j
y is cost per weighted case for 
episode of care y at hospital j. CMIit
j
 is case mix index of patient i at on day t at hospital j 
and T is the total number of days of stay. LOSit
j
 is the weighted length of stay of patient i 
on day t at hospital j and CPWDi(y) is the cost per weighted day for episode of care y at 
hospital j. Bottom-up methods multiply the unit cost of a given procedure, visit, service 
or drug by the times used by a given patient. 
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Table 3.3: Distribution of complete and censored observations during the first three 
years after cervical cancer diagnosis 
Interval Vital status N* Complete 
observations** 
Censored 
observationsº 
Proportion 
censored‡ 
Year 1 Total 784* 570 214 27.3% 
 Deaths 111 99 12  
 Alive 673 471 202  
Years 1-2 Total 784* 416 368 46.9% 
 Deaths 210 160 50  
 Alive 574 256 318  
Years 1-3 Total 784* 280 504 64.3% 
 Deaths 254 176 78  
 Alive 530 104 426  
Year 2 Total 471* 317 154 32.6% 
 Deaths 99 61 38  
 Alive 372 256 116  
Years 2-3 Total 471* 181 290 61.6% 
 Deaths 143 77 66  
 Alive 328 104 224  
Year 3 Total 256* 120 136 53.1% 
 Deaths 44 16 28  
 Alive 212 104 108  
* number of individuals under observation at start of interval; ** number of individuals with 
complete cost data during interval (cases with observed cost data until death or interval end); º 
number of individuals censored during interval (cases that died during interval but with cost data 
censored before death and living censored cases); ‡ proportion censored during interval 
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Table 3.4: Average total medical care costs and specific medical care costs 
associated with cervical cancer cases in the first year after diagnosis 
Sample Survived longer 
than one year 
Died within one 
year 
Overall 
N 673 111 784 
Resource    
Total cost $31,195 ($1,177) $63,016 ($4,246) $35,700 ($1,239) 
Cancer clinic $12,941 ($401) $10,623 ($1,003) $12,613 ($373) 
Hospital-based care    
Inpatient hospitalization $6,914 ($560) $31,088 ($3,048) $10,337 ($712) 
Same day surgery $894 ($41) $459 ($81) $832 ($38) 
ED visits $637 ($43) $1,651 ($143) $781 ($44) 
Dialysis clinic $74 ($62) $746 ($740) $169 ($117) 
Tertiary care    
Rehabilitation 
admissions 
$204 ($118) $0 ($0) $175 ($101) 
Mental health 
admissions 
$156 ($136) $0 ($0) $134 ($117) 
Complex continuing 
care 
$604 ($459) $4,002 ($1,498) $1,045 ($449) 
Long-term care $13 ($13) $255 ($256) $47 ($38) 
Home care $1,432 ($176) $4,128 ($566) $1,814 ($174) 
Physician services $6,062 ($168) $8,113 ($458) $6,352 ($160) 
Prescription drugs $1,034 ($171) $1,777 ($273) $1,139 ($152) 
Other* $230 ($10) $173 ($20) $222 ($9) 
* Other costs include laboratory costs and non-physicians services covered by OHIP. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
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Figure 3.1: Resource utilization of cervical cancer patients in the first year after 
diagnosis among those surviving one year or longer 
 
Figure 3.2: Resource utilization of cervical cancer patients in the first year after 
diagnosis among those that died within one year 
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Table 3.5: Mean annual and cumulative medical care costs associated with cervical 
cancer cases during years one through three after diagnosis 
Interval N* Proportion 
censored** 
 (SE) WT (SE) IMP (SE) Mean 
F/U Time 
(SE)‡ 
 
Year 1 784 27.3% $35,700 
($1,239) 
$39,995 
($1,513) 
$40,231 
($1,356) 
338 (3) 
Years 1-2 784 46.6% $43,086 
($1,785) 
$50,792 
($2,731) 
$52,544 
($2,276) 
622 (8) 
Years 1-3 784 64.3% $45,317 
($1,942) 
$61,586 
($5,199) 
$59,314 
($2,898) 
873 (15) 
 
Year 2 471 32.1% $12,293 
($1,581) 
$14,184 
($2,043) 
$14,459 
($1,787) 
334 (4) 
Years 2-3 471 61.6% $16,007 
($1,992) 
$25,336 
($4,258) 
$22,409 
($2,749) 
628 (11) 
 
Year 3 256 53.1% $6,833 
($1,134) 
$10,258 
($2,138) 
$9,383 
($1,678) 
347 (4) 
* sample size at start of interval; ** proportion of sample censored during interval; ‡ 
follow-up time in days 
 = naïve mean not accounting for censoring; SE = standard error; WT = mean estimated 
using simple weighted method; IMP = mean estimated using improved method; F/U = 
follow-up 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
Figure 3.3: Cumulative overall medical care costs of cervical cancer patients in the 
first three years after diagnosis 
 
 
  
$0
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
$70,000
1 2 3
Naïve mean Simple weighted mean Improved mean
88 
 
3.8 Appendices 
3.8.1 Appendix A3.1 Supplementary Tables 
Table 3.6: Mean overall and cancer-specific costs of cervical patients during the first 
year after diagnosis by one-year vital status 
Vital status N Proportion 
censored 
 (SE) WT (SE) imp (SE) 
Alive      
Overall 673 30.0% $31,195 
($1,177) 
$35,543 
($1,538) 
$35,759 
($1,351) 
Cancer clinic 673 30.0% $12,941 
($401) 
$14,184 
($447) 
$14,628 
($394) 
Died      
Overall 111 10.8% $63,016 
($4,246) 
$65,585 
($4,159) 
$66,250 
($4,084) 
Cancer clinic 111 10.8% $10,623 
($1,003) 
$11,140 
($1,049) 
$11,194 
($1,015) 
 = naïve mean not accounting for censoring; SE = standard error; WT = simple 
weighted mean; imp = improved mean improved. 
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Table 3.7: Comparison of mean cancer clinic costs across different estimation 
methods 
Interval N* Proportion 
censored** 
 (SE) WT (SE) IMP (SE) 
 
Year 1 784 27.3% $12,613 ($373) $13,747 ($414) $14,124 ($370) 
Years 1-2 784 46.6% $13,526 ($410) $14,946 ($562) $15,168 ($446) 
Years 1-3 784 64.3% $13,803 ($430) $15,755 ($894) $16,434 ($545) 
 
Year 2 471 32.1% $1,520 ($172) $1,792 ($247) $1,755 ($215) 
Years 2-3 471 61.6% $1,980 ($252) $2,639 ($614) $2,713 ($384) 
      
Year 3 256 53.1% $848 ($220) $914 ($894) $1,131 ($545) 
* sample size at start of interval; ** proportion of sample censored during interval 
WT = naïve mean not accounting for censoring; SE = standard error; WT = mean 
estimated using simple weighted method; IMP = mean estimated using improved method 
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Table 3.8: Source specific cumulative costs estimated using the simple weighted 
estimator 
Resource Year 1 
(cumulative) 
Year 2 
(cumulative) 
Year 3 
(cumulative) 
Overall $39,995 ($1,1513) $50,792 ($2,731) $61,586 ($5,199) 
Cancer clinic $13,747 ($414) $14,946 ($562) $15,755 ($894) 
Hospital-based care    
Inpatient 
hospitalization 
$11,773 ($861) $16,113 ($1,312) $19,919 ($2,171) 
Same day surgery $851 ($45) $936 ($113) $1,101 ($113) 
ED visits $880 ($56) $1,190 ($80) $1,411 ($143) 
Dialysis clinic $90 ($75) $421 ($393) $1,531 ($1,502) 
Tertiary care    
Rehabilitation 
admissions 
$248 ($144) $557 ($278) $857 ($443) 
Mental health 
admissions 
$190 ($165) $60 ($35) $83 ($50) 
Complex continuing 
care 
$1,382 ($611) $1,209 ($327) $1,702 ($499) 
Long-term care $16 ($16) $25 ($25) $56 ($0) 
Home care $2,203 ($233) $3,267 ($360) $4,494 ($687) 
Physician services $6,985 ($197) $9,595 ($938) $11,219 ($1,291) 
Prescription drugs $1,395 ($211) $2,129 ($293) $3,026 ($587) 
Other* $235 ($11) $235 ($23) $422 ($34) 
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Chapter 4  
4 An Economic Analysis of Financial Incentives for 
Cervical Cancer Screening in Ontario’s Primary Care 
Delivery Models 
4.1 Introduction 
Cervical cancer screening with the Papanicolaou (Pap) smear test can prevent cervical 
cancer by detecting and treating cervical dysplasia before it becomes malignant [1-3]. 
Screening may also detect earlier stage cancers, requiring less invasive treatment and 
better survival than symptomatic cancers [1]. The impacts of screening on cervical cancer 
incidence and mortality have been consistently demonstrated in epidemiological studies 
[4-7] and screening is considered cost-effective [8].  
Despite the benefits of screening and universal access to cancer screening, many 
Canadian women are not screened at the recommended interval, and Canadian screening 
rates are consistently lower than rates in the US [9,10]. Ontario guidelines recommend 
that women who are or ever have been sexually active between the ages of 21 and 69 are 
screened with a Pap smear once every three years [2,3]. Screening participation in 
Ontario, Canada’s largest province, has improved slightly over the past decade, but is still 
well below the provincial target of 85% [11]. Between 2009 and 2011 only 65% of 
women aged 21 to 69 years were screened [11]. Given the risks of screening non-
compliance, there is a clear need to increase screening participation rates. 
In an attempt to improve the delivery of preventive health care services, such as Pap 
testing, Ontario underwent a series of primary care reforms in the early 2000s. The 
Ontario government introduced reformed primary care models with alternative physician 
remuneration to traditional fee-for-service (FFS) payments and pay-for-performance 
(P4P) incentives to improve delivery of preventive healthcare services. The two dominant 
models are the Family Health Group (FHG) and Family Health Organization (FHO), 
which have enhanced FFS and blended capitation reimbursement schemes, respectively. 
The FHG and FHO offer patient enrolment, enhanced access and special premiums and 
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incentives, such as the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus, which are unavailable in the 
traditional FFS model. The Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus is a P4P program where 
physicians are awarded stepped payments for achieving targeted participation levels. 
With respect to Pap testing, physicians may receive between $220 and $2,200 in bonuses 
for achieving the lowest and highest participation levels, respectively (Appendix 4.1). 
Alternative funding plans and performance incentives are becoming increasingly popular 
both in the Canada and worldwide; however there is no conclusion on the effectiveness of 
incentives or on the optimal incentive to deliver high quality care [12-15]. There is 
limited evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives for improving cancer 
screening rates, and to the best of my knowledge, there has been no cost-effectiveness 
analysis of financial incentives for improving cervical cancer screening rates.  
In this study, I used estimated cancer screening rates from three primary care delivery 
models in Ontario to determine the cost-effectiveness of screening in the following 
settings: 1) FFS without P4P incentives (i.e. traditional FFS); 2) FFS with P4P incentives 
(i.e. FHG); and 3) capitation with P4P incentives (i.e. FHO).  
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Model Description 
I adapted a previously published model of the natural history of cervical cancer [16-18]. 
Every 6 months my microsimulation model tracks women through a series of health 
states representing the progression from infection with human papillomavirus (HPV) to 
cervical intraepithelial neoplsia (CIN) and eventually to invasive cervical cancer (Figure 
4.1). Women may progress, regress or remain in a given health state up to the cervical 
cancer health state where regression is no longer permitted. Natural history parameters 
are age-specific and dependent on HPV type (low-risk versus high-risk type) [16-20].  
In addition to the natural history model, my microsimulation model incorporates 
screening, follow-up of abnormal results and treatment of cervical cancer precursors. The 
following assumptions were made for this analysis: (i) 13% of women are never 
screened, 70% are screened within three years and the remaining women are screened 
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sporadically once every six years [21,22]; (ii) in each cycle women have an age-specific 
probability of being screened [11]; (iii) Pap smear sensitivity and specificity are age-
dependent [23-25]; (iv) women have an age-specific probability of following up with 
abnormal test results [11,26,27]; (v) only infections with high-risk HPV may progress to 
cancer; (vi) women with biopsy confirmed CIN grade 2/3 (CIN23) and cancer were 
compliant with treatment; (vii) women with undiagnosed cancer may progress to 
subsequent stages based on values found in the literature [16,17]; (viii) women in the 
model face age-specific probabilities of non-cervical cancer-related death [28] and 
hysterectomy [29].  See Appendix 4.2 for detailed model figures. 
My model was developed in two steps. First, the natural history parameters of a model 
with entry to the well state at age 12 were calibrated to match age-specific prevalence of 
HPV [19,30-36] and incidence of cervical cancer [7,37]. Where possible Canadian data 
were selected for calibration. Additional calibration targets included the stage distribution 
of cervical cancer cases [11] and the ratio of deaths to incident cases [18,38]. Ranges of 
parameters (incidence, progression and regression of HPV infection; progression and 
regression of CIN) found in the literature were tested in the model until an acceptable fit 
was found. After selecting a set of natural history parameters (Tables 4.1 and 4.2), model 
entry age was changed to 35 years and women enter different initial health states to 
match the observed distribution of states from model calibration. The model entry and 
exit ages (35 and 70 years, respectively) were chosen to match the target population of 
the Cumulative Preventive Care bonus. Second, a decision model with three arms 
representing FFS, FHG and FHO was created using TreeAge Pro 2014. Each arm 
represents a different primary care model and holds the microsimulation model 
developed in step one. Across all three arms, all parameters are the same except for age-
specific cancer screening rates and the cost of a screening Pap smear [39]. 
4.2.2 Primary Care Model Screening Rates 
The results of the traditional FFS model were compared to FFG and FHO models. I also 
compared the results of FHO with FHG. The proportions of regular, sporadic and never 
screened women were altered to reflect the differences in overall screening rates across 
the three primary care models (Table 4.3). 
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4.2.3 Cost and Effectiveness Data 
All cost and effectiveness data utilized in the microsimulation model are summarized in 
Table 4.4. The costs of screening and repeat Pap smears include both the delivery and 
laboratory costs [40]. Physicians practicing in the traditional FFS model do not receive 
incentives for cancer screening, so the cost of a screening Pap smear in this model is the 
base (delivery and laboratory) cost of a test [40]. In the FHG and FHO models, the costs 
of screening Pap smears also include the costs of bonuses paid to physicians [39]. The 
cost of a repeat Pap smear is the base cost in all three primary care models. Colposcopy 
and treatment of CIN were estimated using the provincial fee schedule and data found in 
the literature [18,25,40]. Cancer treatment costs were estimated from patient-level data on 
women diagnosed with cervical cancer in Ontario between 2007 and 2010 [41]. 
Treatment costs include total medical care costs after accounting for censoring and were 
adjusted by cancer stage using stage-specific cost distributions found in the literature 
[16,17,42].
7
  I included treatment costs for the first three years after diagnosis as during 
this period most cancer-related costs are accumulated [43,44]. Health-related quality of 
life associated with different cervical cancer progression states were obtained from the 
published literature [17,45-48]. Utility values for healthy individuals were taken from 
published literature using the Health Utilities Index Mark-3 [45], and disease state 
utilities were based on time trade-off methods, the Health Utilities Index Mark-2 and the 
Health and Activities Limitation Index [17,46-48]. Utilities were used to estimate effects 
using quality-adjusted life years (QALYs). 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Model Calibration 
Figure 4.2 presents the model predicted and observed age-specific HPV prevalence rates. 
Figure 4.3 presents the model predicted and observed age-specific incidence of cervical 
cancer. HPV prevalence reaches a peak around age 20 and decreases until around age 50, 
                                                 
7
 Mean cancer cost was assumed to represent treatment costs for stages 2-3 cancers. The percentage 
differences from stage 2-3 costs to stage 1 and stage 4 cancers found in the literature were then applied to 
my estimates of mean treatment costs. 
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after which it starts to increase again [19,31,32,33]. Incidence of cervical cancer peaks 
between the ages of 40 and 44 and then decreases thereafter [7]. The model predicted 
stage distribution of cases was similar to observed data [11], as was the predicted ratio of 
cervical cancer cases to related deaths (0.29) was similar to observed data (0.30) [18,38]. 
4.3.2 Model Results 
Table 4.5 presents the expected lifetime numbers of cervical cancer cases, stage 
distribution of cases and cancer-related deaths associated with the different primary care 
models. The traditional FFS model and FHO were associated with the lowest and highest 
expected cases of cervical cancer, respectively. The FHG and FHO models were 
associated with the lowest and highest numbers of expected cervical cancer-related 
deaths, respectively. However the FHG had the lowest ratio of deaths to incident cases 
(0.25) and the traditional FFS model had the highest (0.31). The FHG and FHO models 
were associated with greater proportions of stage I cases than the traditional FFS model.  
The costs and effects, measured in QALYs, are summarized in Table 4.6 (first two 
columns) and the efficiency curve for the three primary care models is presented in 
Figure 4.4. Effects were fairly similar across all three models and only differed by about 
0.1-0.2 QALYs. Costs were lowest in the traditional FFS model and highest in the FHG. 
Compared to the traditional FFS model, the FHO model is more costly and slightly more 
effective. The FHG model is the most costly model, but slightly more effective than the 
FFS while not more effective than the FHO. 
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) are summarized in Table 4.6 (last two 
columns) Relative to the traditional FFS model, one would need to spend about an extra 
$8,000 for each additional QALY in the FHO model. Compared to the FFS model, an 
extra $23,500 is needed for each QALY gained in the FHG. The FHG is more costly and 
less effective than the FHO, so it is dominated. 
4.4 Discussion 
My results suggest that there are similar QALYs and different costs for cervical cancer 
screening in Ontario’s primary care delivery models. The traditional FFS model is the 
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least costly and least effective. The Family Health Group, an enhanced FFS model 
featuring pay-for-performance incentives, is dominated, as it is the most costly, but not 
most effective compared to FHO. The FHO, a blended capitation model featuring pay-
for-performance incentives, is the most effective and less costly than the FHG model.  
I found similar effects across all three models, which is somewhat surprising and my 
results should be interpreted with caution. In theory, the primary care model with the 
highest screening rate would have the greatest QALYs. There are several reasons that 
may explain why this was not the case in my data. The incidence of cervical cancer in 
Canada is low (age-standardized incidence rate: 7.8 per 100,000 women) [49], so small 
differences in screening rates (<10%) may not affect the number of cases diagnosed in a 
meaningful way. Another contributing factor may be the stage distribution of cases across 
primary care models. Model predictions show that the FHG and FHO were associated 
with higher proportions of stage I cases than the FFS model, and it is possible that this is 
the result of earlier diagnoses. The FHG had the highest screening participation rate 
overall and among the oldest age category (60-69 years). My model endpoint is when 
screening cessation is recommended at age 70. It is plausible that women screened during 
their 60s in the FHG may be asymptomatic cases that would be missed by the other 
models. Furthermore, the FHG and FHO had fewer expected deaths to incident cases.  
It is not surprising that the FHG and FHO have the highest costs. Physicians practicing in 
a traditional FFS practice do not receive financial incentives for meeting Pap smear 
quality targets, so the cost of screening is much lower in this model than in those 
featuring bonuses. Furthermore, the FHG has the highest screening participation rate, 
which greatly increases the costs of delivering screening. With more screening tests 
performed in the FHG, the volume of follow-up investigations for abnormal tests and 
treatments for CIN are also higher, which has a substantial impact on cost. While the cost 
of treating a cervical cancer patient is much higher than to treat a case of CIN, the volume 
of cancers is so low that screening and follow-up costs are substantially higher than 
cervical cancer treatment costs. Considering that bonus payments nearly double the cost 
of a screening Pap smear and increase the service volume, it is expected that overall 
screening costs would be highest in the model with the highest screening rate.  
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My findings are generally consistent with past research suggesting that increased cervical 
cancer participation (through more frequent screening) is not cost-effective [50-52]. 
However these findings should be interpreted with caution as while the costs of screening 
are high, it has caused drastic declines in both incidence and mortality [7]. This study and 
its results present a unique addition to the literature on the cost-effectiveness of cervical 
cancer screening. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first economic analysis of 
financial incentives for cervical cancer screening. Indeed, the evidence on the cost-
effectiveness of incentives for all conditions is extremely limited [13]. Compared to the 
traditional FFS model, my findings indicate that a capitation model featuring P4P 
incentives is cost-effective and that an enhanced FFS model is dominated compared to 
FHO. 
There are several limitations to my analyses. As in all economic analyses of cervical 
cancer screening, there is uncertainty in the natural history data. I attempted to address 
this by calibrating my model to observed Canadian epidemiological data. Another 
potential limitation is that the Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus guidelines expanded 
the target population to women aged 21 to 69 years in 2013. I was unable to capture how 
this will affect screening among younger women and their lifetime risk of cervical 
cancer. Future studies of cervical cancer screening in Ontario should address this change. 
My model did not account for the vaccination status of women. However this may not 
have affected my target population as vaccination is recommended to take place during 
adolescence. Furthermore, there is limited data on how the HPV vaccine performs in 
populations or its the long-term effects [25,53]. Finally, my results may not be 
generalizable to other jurisdictions in Canada. 
4.5 Conclusions 
In conclusion, my results suggest that a capitation model with financial incentives may be 
more cost-effective than FFS models with and without incentives at delivering cervical 
cancer screening. Future research within Ontario should explore the effects of the new 
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus guidelines on the costs of screening and predicted 
risk of cervical cancer. Future research may build upon my results by investigating the 
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cost-effectiveness of capitation systems without incentives, and salaried models with and 
without incentives. 
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4.7 Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 4.1: Natural history of cervical cancer 
Well indicates no infection with human papillomavirus (HPV) or cervical disease. HR 
HPV indicates infection with high-risk type HPV and LR HPV indicates infection with 
low-risk type HPV. CIN1 and CIN23 indicate cervical intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN) 
grades one and two or higher, respectively. Stage I indicates stage one cervical cancer, 
which may progress to stage two and so on until stage four cancer. At any point women 
in the model may die or receive a hysterectomy unrelated to cervical cancer. In the 
absence of screening, women with cervical cancer may only be diagnosed if they become 
symptomatic. 
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Table 4.1: Natural history parameters for HPV and CIN 
Variable High- risk HPV Low-risk HPV 
Incidence of HPV infection [16-20] 
13 0.0036 0.0014 
14 0.0182 0.0071 
15 0.0369 0.0144 
17 0.0446 0.0173 
19 0.0857 0.0333 
20 0.0770 0.0300 
30 0.0182 0.0071 
40 0.0145 0.0057 
45 0.0109 0.0042 
50 0.0190 0.0063 
Regression from HPV to normal [16,17,20] 
13 0.280 0.230 
35 0.174 0.143 
Progression from HPV to CIN1 [16,17,20] 
  0.08 0.045 
Progression from HPV to CIN23 [16,17,20] 
13 0.006 0.006 
35 0.01 0.02 
Regression from CIN1 [16,17,20] 
To well 0.15 0.162 
To HPV infection 0.062 0.09 
Regression from CIN23 [16,17,20] 
To well 0.001 0.003 
To HPV infection 0.01 0.02 
To CIN1 0.002 0.03 
Progression from CIN1 to CIN23 [16,17,20] 
13 0.08 0.04 
35 0.12 0.045 
HPV = human papillomavirus; CIN1 = cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grade 1; CIN23 = 
cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grades 2-3 
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Table 4.2: Cancer progression parameters 
Variable 
Progression from CIN23 to cancer by age [16-18,20] High-risk HPV 
15  0.0005 
20  0.0008 
25  0.0065 
30  0.015 
35  0.0255 
40  0.028 
45  0.0335 
50  0.032 
55  0.022 
60  0.0180 
65  0.015 
70  0.025 
Cancer stage progression [16,17]  
Stage I to II  0.15 
Stage II to III  0.16 
Stage III to IV  0.225 
Probability of symptoms [16,17] 5-year survival [16,17] 
Stage I 0.078 84.04% 
Stage II 0.120 66.32% 
Stage III 0.368 40.29% 
Stage IV 0.684 15.83% 
HPV = human papillomavirus; CIN1 = cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grade 1; 
CIN23 = cervical intraepithelial neoplasia grades 2-3 
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Table 4.3: Screening participation, screening test characteristics and follow-up 
variables 
Variables FFS FHG FHO 
Screening rate [39]    
35 76.3% 85.5% 82.7% 
40 72.9% 83.6% 80.1% 
50 69.7% 82.0% 78.3% 
60 66.4% 79.2% 75.0% 
Test characteristics [23-25] Sensitivity Specificity 
 CIN1 CIN23 <CIN1 
15 0.42 0.57 0.97 
35 0.32 0.38 0.982 
12-month follow-up abnormal results [11,26,27] 
Low-grade abnormality (ASCUS, LSIL)  0.81 
High-grade abnormality (ASC-H, HSIL)  0.90 
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health 
Organization; ASCUS = atypical cells of unknown significance; LSIL = low-grade 
squamous intraepithelial lesions; ASC-H = atypical cells of undetermined significance; 
HSIL = high-grade squamous intraepithelial lesion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
Table 4.4: Cost and effectiveness variables 
Cost variables  
Screening Pap smear [39,40]   
FFS   $18.30 
FHG   $29.71 
FHO   $35.02 
Repeat Pap smear [40]  $18.30 
Colposcopy and biopsy [20,40]  $152.60 
CIN treatment [18,20,40]  $1,105 
Cancer treatment [16,17,41,42]   
 Stage I Stages II-III Stage IV 
Year 1 $25,345 $40,231 $55,116 
Year 2 $9,109 $14,459 $19,809 
Year 3 $5,911 $9,383 $12,855 
Health-related quality of life [45]   
Low-grade abnormality [46]  0.97 
High-grade abnormality [46]  0.93 
Detected cancer [17,46-48] In treatment Post-treatment 
Stage I 0.80 0.90 
Stages II-III 0.67 0.90 
Stage IV 0.48 0.62 
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health Organization 
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Figure 4.2: Observed and model predicted age-specific prevalence of high-risk (HR) 
human papillomavirus (HPV) types and all types of HPV from model calibration 
Note that HR types include all carcinogenic HPV types: -16, -18, -31, -33, -35, -39, -45, -
51, -52, -56, -58, -59, -68, -73, -82. 
Note that observed results come from the literature [19,30-36]. 
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Figure 4.3: Observed and model predicted age-specific incidence (per 100,000 
women) of cervical cancer from model calibration 
Note that observed results come from Dickinson et al. (2012) [7]. 
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Table 4.5: Model predicted cervical cancer cases, stage distribution and deaths 
Primary care model Cases Deaths Death to case ratio 
Traditional FFS 424 131 0.309 
Stage I 50.47%   
Stage II 27.12%   
Stage III 15.80%   
Stage IV 6.61%   
FHG 463 118 0.255 
Stage I 57.67%   
Stage II 26.78%   
Stage III 8.86%   
Stage IV 6.69%   
FHO 474 138 0.291 
Stage I 60.12%   
Stage II 23.00%   
Stage III 10.34%   
Stage IV 6.54%   
FFS = fee-for-service; FHG = Family Health Group; FHO = Family Health 
Organization 
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Table 4.6: Model predicted costs and effects by primary care delivery model and 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios 
Model Costs (CAD $) Effects 
(QALYs) 
ICER ICER relative 
to FFS 
FFS 450.36 28.3552 - - 
FHO 633.34 28.3781 $7990.39 $7990.39 
FHG 678.69 28.3649 Dominated $23,539.18 
ICER = incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; FFS = fee-for-service; FHO = Family 
Health Group; FHG = Family Health Organization 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Efficiency curve of costs versus effects (quality-adjusted life years) 
  
FFS 
FHG 
FHO 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
28.35 28.355 28.36 28.365 28.37 28.375 28.38
C
o
s
ts
 (
2
0
1
0
 $
C
A
D
) 
Quality-adjusted life years 
113 
 
4.8 Appendices 
4.8.1 Appendix A4.1 
Table 4.7: Cumulative preventive care bonuses for cervical cancer screening 
Achieved Screening 
Participation Rate 
Fee Payable 
60% $220 
65% $440 
70% $660 
75% $1,320 
80% $2,200 
 
4.8.2 Appendix A4.2 Microsimulation Model Figures 
 
Figure 4.5: Decision analytic model 
Each arm in the decision arm represents a different primary care delivery model 
(traditional fee-for-service [FFS], Family Health Group [FHG], Family Health 
Organization [FHO]), and at the end of each arm is a microsimulation model of the 
natural history of cervical cancer that incorporates screening, follow-up and treatment of 
abnormal results, and cancer treatment. 
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Figure 4.6: Health states in the microsimulation model 
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Figure 4.7: Natural history model of cervical cancer and allowable health state 
transitions 
Note that women may be infected with low-risk or high-risk human papillomavirus 
(HPV) types and that both low-risk and high-risk infections may progress to cervical 
intraepithelial neoplasia (CIN) grade 1 (CIN1) or grades 2-3 (CIN23). However only 
CIN23 infected with high-risk HPV types may progress to invasive cervical cancer.  
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Figure 4.8: Follow-up of abnormal Pap smear results 
ASCUS = atypical squamous cells of unknown significance; LSIL = low-grade squamous 
intraepithelial lesion; HSIL = high-grade squamous intraepithelial lesions; ASC-H = 
atypical cells of unknown significance – cannot exclude HSIL.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusions 
5.1 Summary and Concluding Statements 
I compared cervical cancer screening rates among three of Ontario’s dominant primary 
care delivery models: the traditional fee-for-service model, the Family Health Group and 
the Family Health Organization. My results suggest that there are significant differences 
in screening participation rates between models after controlling for patient and physician 
characteristics. The FHG, an enhanced FFS model where physicians are eligible for 
financial incentives, was observed to have the highest screening participation rate. The 
blended capitation model (i.e. FHO) had the second highest screening rate, and the 
traditional FFS model, in which physicians do not receive bonuses for screening, had the 
lowest screening rate. 
Screening rates were used to populate a decision analytic model consisting of three 
Monte Carlo microsimulation models representing the FFS, FHG and FHO models. This 
model was developed from previously published models of cervical cancer screening [1-
3] and calibrated to match observed data from Ontario [4-13]. Analysis of the overall and 
specific costs of Ontario women diagnosed with cervical cancer was conducted to 
estimate the treatment costs associated with cervical cancer.  
Results from the economic model suggest that the FHO is cost-effective relative to the 
traditional FFS model and that the FHG is dominated by the FHO. However, the model 
predicted effects were similar across the three primary care models and the FHG had the 
lowest death to incident case ratio. The FHG and FFS models were the most and least 
costly, respectively, but the difference in cost was about $230. It is not surprising that the 
FHG has the highest costs as it features screening bonuses to physicians. Furthermore the 
FHG has the highest screening rate, which increases the costs of delivering Pap smears 
and costs associated with follow-up of abnormal results. The model predicted the FHO 
and traditional FFS model to be the most and least effective, respectively, with a 
difference of 0.023 quality-adjusted life years. Compared to the traditional FFS model, 
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one would need to spend an additional $8,000/QALY in the FHO, which is considered 
cost-effective with a willingness to pay of $50,000/QALY.  
Despite the FHG having significantly higher screening rates than the FHO, it had slightly 
lower quality-adjusted life years. The incidence of cervical cancer in Canada is very low, 
so small differences in screening rates may not have a large effect. As mentioned 
previously, my model tracked women until age 70, so higher screening rates may be 
effective at diagnosing cases at earlier stages and ages. However this potential effect is 
likely to be minimal as peak incidence occurs while women are between the ages of 40 
and 45 years [13]. 
These results may be useful for decision makers and aid in policy development. Both 
reformed models featuring P4P incentives, FHG and FHO, had greater QALYs and are 
cost-effective relative to the traditional FFS model. It should also be noted that I was 
unable to assess screening rates before incentives were introduced and that differences in 
screening rates by physician primary care model may have existed prior to primary care 
reform [14]. Considering that $28.3 million was spent on cervical cancer screening 
bonuses between 2006/2007 and 2009/2010 and the limited effectiveness of the program, 
its continuation remains an open question [14]. 
Future research can build upon these analyses in several ways. First, I was unable to 
assess temporal trends in cervical cancer screening, and an economic analysis that 
accounts for baseline differences in screening rates is warranted. Second, the cervical 
cancer Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus guidelines recently changed to include women 
aged 21 to 34 years in the target population. This may affect screening participation and 
costs. Third, the effects of the breast cancer and colorectal cancer Cumulative Preventive 
Care Bonuses on screening rates, incidence and mortality have not been widely studied. 
Financial incentives have been shown to have no effect on breast cancer screening in 
Ontario [14,15]. However one study reported a near 10% increase in colorectal cancer 
screening after incentives were introduced, which is much larger than the estimated 3% 
increase for cervical cancer [15]. Given that colorectal screening incentives are more 
effective at improving participation and that the incidence of colorectal cancer is greater 
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than that of cervical cancer, incentives for colorectal cancer screening may be cost-
effective and an economic analysis is warranted. Finally, I did not include salaried 
physicians in my analyses. Future work could expand my study of the effects of 
remuneration on cervical cancer screening to include salaried physicians. 
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6 Supplementary Appendix 
Appendix A: Dataset Creation Plan 
 
Dataset Creation Plan 
Name and Number of Study 
Cost-Effectiveness of Cervical Cancer Screening in Primary 
Care Funding Models 
Research Program PCPH 
Contacts 
Ciara Pendrith 
Sisira Sarma 
Amardeep Thind  
Who will be responsible for DCP 
updates? 
Ciara Pendrith 
PIA Approved? No 
DCP update history 
1
st
 Draft: November 20, 2013 
 
Short Description of Research 
Question 
 
Objectives:  
To conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis of financial 
incentives for cervical cancer screening in Ontario’s 
primary healthcare delivery models. 
To assess which of the reformed primary health care 
model is the most cost-effective in delivering cervical 
cancer screening. 
To determine the target level of screening participation at 
which incentives could be cost-effective. 
 
Main population of interest: 
Female patients aged 35 to 69 years and without prior cervical 
cancer diagnoses or hysterectomy in the province of Ontario 
between the years 2005 and 2010. 
 
Main outcomes of interest: 
Outcomes are screening rates & associated costs, incidence 
(number of patients diagnosed with cervical cancer per year in 
various models), primary treatment type & associated costs, 
overall survival and 5-year survival. 
List of Datasets Used 
1. CPDB (required from January 1, 2005 to March 
31, 2011) 
2. CAPE (available from January 1999, required from 
January 1, 2005 to March 31, 2011) 
3. RPDB (available from 1990, required from January 
1, 2005 to December 31, 2012) 
4. OHIP (available from January 1991, required from 
January 1991 to December 31, 2012) 
Claim Type 
 All 
Code Types 
 Fee codes 
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 Diagnosis codes 
5. OCR (available from 1964, required from 1964 to 
December 31, 2011) 
6. IPDB (available from 1992, required December 31, 
2010  
7. CIHI-DAD (available from 1986, required from 
1986-2011 to identify total abdominal 
hysterectomy) 
Other Details 
1. For look-back period 
Reference date 
 Do not include index date in look-back period (stop at 
index-1) 
Time Frame Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part A – Physician & Screening Cohorts 
Accrual Start/End Dates March 31, 2011 
Max Follow-up Date March 31, 2011 
Lookback Window(s) 3 years to identify adequately screened women  
Maximum lookback date: April 1, 2008  
Cohort Selection 
Index Event Cross-sectional analysis of population-based cohort 
March 31, 2011 
Inclusion Criteria Part 1 – Defining the Physician Sample See Table 1a for format 
1. Using CPDB, select full-time comprehensive primary care physicians 
affiliated with a FHG, FHO or traditional FFS model on March 31, 2011. 
Exclude physicians with a narrow scope of practice (e.g. sports medicine, 
counselling, psychotherapy, etc) 
Part 2 – Defining Physician Patient Populations (Screening Cohort) See Table 1b 
for format 
1. Identify patient populations of physician sample that are eligible for cervical 
cancer screening on index date 
2. Select female patients aged 35 to 69 years inclusive on index date that are 
formally rostered to sample physicians affiliated with a FHG or FHO model 
3. Analyze OHIP billings using the ICES algorithm to define practice 
populations of physicians affiliated with the traditional FFS model and select 
female patients aged 35 to 69 years inclusive on index date 
Exclusions 
(In order) 
 
1. Invalid IKN 
2. Evidence of death of patient on or before the index date 
3. Non-Ontario residents 
4. Evidence of history of cervical, endometrial or ovarian cancer diagnoses. 
Defined by codes in Appendix A in the DXCODE variable in OCR between 
1964 and March 31, 2008 
5. Evidence of prior hysterectomy. Defined by procedure codes in Appendix B 
Look-back Window Observation Window 
(in which to look for outcomes) 
Index Event Date 
Accrual Window 
Max Follow-up Date 
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in CIHI-DAD between 1986 and March 31, 2011 
6. Evidence of HIV infection by entry in HIV database up to March 31, 2011 
 
Size of Cohort Enter total size of cohort when available 
Part B – Cancer Cohort 
Accrual Start/End Dates January 1, 2005 – December 31, 2010 
Max Follow-up Date December 31, 2012 
When does observation 
window terminate? 
Patients will be followed from index event until end of follow-up or date of 
death 
Lookback Window(s) 10 years to assess screening history. Farthest lookback date: January 1, 1995 
Cohort Selection 
Index Event Retrospective cohort study 
Cancer diagnosis 
Defining the Cancer Cohort 
See Table 1c for format 
Inclusion Criteria 1. Using RPDB, identify women aged 35-69 at risk for cervical cancer each year 
between January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2010  
2. Using OCR, identify all patients diagnosed with cervical cancer between 
January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2010 defined by ICD-9 codes in Appendix 
C in the DXCODE or DXCODE_RES 
Exclusions 
(In order) 
 
1. Invalid IKN 
2. Evidence of death of patient on or before the index date 
3. Non-Ontario residents 
4. Evidence of history of cervical, endometrial or ovarian cancer diagnoses. 
Defined by codes in Appendix A in the DXCODE variable in OCR between 
1964 and December 31, 2004 
5. Evidence of prior hysterectomy. Defined by codes in Appendix B in CIHI-
DAD between 1986 and December 31, 2004 
6. Evidence of HIV infection by entry in HIV database prior to index date 
 
Size of Cohort Enter total size of cohort when available 
Variable Definitions 
 
Main Exposure or 
Risk Factor 
Primary Care Funding Model 
1. Traditional FFS – control 
2. Blended FFS (FHG) – treatment 
3. Blended capitation (FHO) – treatment 
 
Cumulative Preventive Care Bonus 
1. Traditional FFS – control 
2. FHG & FHO – treatment 
 
Baseline 
Characteristics 
 
Part A 
 
Assessed at index date 
 
Physician Characteristics (CPDB, CAPE, IPDB, OHIP) 
1. Encrypted OHIP number from PHYSNUM (or other physician identifier) 
(CPDB) 
2. Age from BDATE (IPDB) 
3. Gender from SEX (IPDB) 
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4. Year of graduation from GRADYEAR (IPDB) 
5. International medical graduate status from IMG (IPDB) 
6. Family Health Team membership status (CPDB) 
7. Group affiliation at index date and date of eligibility for that group from 
GRPNUM & STRTELIG from the PHYS_AFFILIATION dataset (CPDB) 
8. Patient enrolment model type from PROGTYPE (for FHG & FHO 
physicians) (CAPE) 
9. Screen eligible practice size (CAPE, OHIP) 
 
Patient Characteristics (RPDB, CAPE) 
1. Age, from %getdemo 
2. Ontario Marginalization Index 
3. Rurality index as per ICES algorithm  (RPDB) 
4. Include the following program enrolment variables: STATUS_CAPE, 
PROGTYPE, PHYSNUM (CAPE) 
5. Physician number and model type for patients of FFS physicians   
 
Baseline 
Characteristics 
 
Part B 
 
Assessed at index date (cancer diagnosis) 
 
Cancer Cohort Characteristics (RPDB, OCR, CAPE, OHIP) 
1. Ontario Marginalization Index 
2. Rurality index as per ICES algorithm (RPDB) 
3. Include the following program enrolment variables: STATUS_CAPE, 
PROGTYPE, PHYSNUM (CAPE) 
4. Include physician number and model type for patients of FFS physicians 
5. Diagnosis date from DXDATE & DXDATE_FLAG (OCR) 
6. Age at diagnosis from AGE (OCR) 
7. ICD9 reportable status & ICD9 resolved site from DXCODE & 
DXCODE_RES (OCR) 
8. Histology and histological behaviour from HIST, HIST_RES, BEHAVIOR, 
BEHAVIOR_RES (OCR) 
9. ACG score (use shorter version) 
 
Outcome 
Definitions 
 
 
Part A 
 
Part A  
Screening Outcomes 
1. Screening Rates (OHIP) see table 2a for format 
 Identify screening rate of each physician’s patient population on index date 
 Patients are considered screened if they have at least one claim to OHIP 
with any of the fee codes in Appendix D within the past three years (April 
1, 2008 – March 31, 2011) 
 Stratify by age groups: 35-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69 
2. Screening Costs (OHIP) see table 2b for format 
 Identify preventive care bonuses claimed by each eligible FHG and FHO 
physician on March 31, 2011 from OHIP Architected Payments database 
 Applicable bonuses are defined by fee codes in Appendix E  
 
 
Outcome 
Definitions 
 
Part B 
 
Cancer Cohort Outcomes 
1. Screening History (OHIP) see table 3 for format 
 Link cancer cases to OHIP claims database to identify screening history 
 For all cancer cases, identify three most recent Pap smear billed to OHIP 
prior to date of diagnosis – look back a maximum of ten years  
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 Include dates of tests billed 
2. Diagnosis & Pre-Cancer Treatments (OHIP)  
 For all cancer cases, identify colposcopies and procedures (defined by 
claims with fee codes in Appendix F) to treat pre-cancers billed to OHIP 
prior to date of diagnosis – look back a maximum of two years. Include 
FEECODE, FEESUFF, DXCODE, SERVDATE 
3. Total Healthcare Costs (OHIP)  
 Run cost macro (%getcost) for each cancer case yearly from date of 
diagnosis until date of death or end of follow-up 
4. Mortality (RPDB) 
 Identify any deaths & cause of death from RPDB 
 
 
Outline of Analysis Plan 
1. Screening participation rates 
 Calculate the proportion of women adequately screened by primary care funding model and age 
group 
2. Screening bonus payments 
 Document the number of physicians in each funding model claiming each bonus level  
3. Follow-up of abnormalities 
 Estimate the number and proportion of women receiving colposcopy and other procedures to 
follow-up abnormal Pap results 
4. Incidence of cervical cancer 
 Estimate the at risk populations and proportions diagnosed with cervical cancer each year between 
2005 and 2010 
 Estimate proportions of cases diagnosed through screening and interval detection 
 Using Kaplan-Meier survival analysis, estimate progression from date of last normal or abnormal 
screen to date of cancer diagnosis 
5. Cervical-cancer related mortality & survival 
 Document the number and proportion of cancer cases that have a cancer-related cause of death 
 Using Kaplan-Meier survival analysis, estimate 2- and 5-year cervical cancer survival from date of 
diagnosis to date of death 
6. Total healthcare costs for cancer patients after diagnosis 
 Estimate total healthcare costs of women diagnosed through screening and interval detection after 
diagnosis 
7. Cost-effectiveness analysis 
 A decision analytic model will be used to assess the cost-effectiveness of financial incentives for 
cervical cancer screening. Transition probabilities between health states will be estimated using 
screening, cancer progression and survival rates. Costs of screening, diagnosis and cancer 
treatments will be estimated from OHIP billings and cost macro results. Quality-adjusted-life-
years will be estimated from the product of published state-specific utilities and time spent in each 
health state 
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